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Research Question: How can online self-radicalisation be successfully 
countered?   
 
Due to the heightened prevalence of Islamic extremism coupled with the 
wide acceptance of online social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, 
etc.), what was once a regional phenomenon established only in areas housing 
terrorist networks – particularly the Middle East, has now found its way to the 
doorstep of many Western countries.  Considering the extremeness of 
radicalisation, many ponder how an individual could adopt such a behavior and, 
or, beliefs that bolster his or her engagement in subversive and terrorist activity.  
Accordingly, what was formerly assumed to be the existence of a single, 
universally applied, terrorist personality, is now understood as a gradual process 
undergone by individuals motivated by separate agendas and incentives.  
Although the process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremism has been 
argued to be the product of radicalisation and the development of extreme 
ideologies; radicalising by developing or adopting extremist beliefs that justify 
violence is just one possible pathway into terrorism involvement (Borum, 
2011).  Alternatively, it is important to note that most people who hold radical 
ideas do not end up engaging in terrorism, just as all terrorists may not be as 
deeply ideological as they are perceived to be.  Likewise, though the rapid 
spread and influence of these individual occurrences seem to be, at first glance, 
precipitated by external terrorist organisations located abroad; the underlying 
influential component consists of a fundamentalist temperament supplemented 
with an online social outlet for self-expression. 
In many cases it has been argued that the Internet, operating through the 
medium of cyberspace (the total landscape of technology-mediated 
communication), provides mechanisms (social media platforms and online 
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services) by which individuals, who would otherwise not have conducted a 
terrorist attack, can self-radicalise and access the information they require to 
carry out such attacks (Kebbell & Romyn, 2016, p. 92).  Additionally, 
extremists have been known to broadcast their views, provoke negative 
sentiment toward enemies, incite people to violence, glorify martyrs, and create 
virtual communities with like-minded individuals in order to convey their 
message and groom new recruits on online social media platforms, such as: 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other online services (COPS, 2014).  In 
contrast to terrorist networks - such as the Islamic State (IS) and al Qaeda - 
radicalising and recruiting individuals in the physical sense, the internet has the 
ability to shroud methodological steps taken in order for militants to connect 
with, communicate with, and muster, prospect radicals.  Technologies such as 
virtual private networks (VPN), onion routers (TOR) and other forms of 
encryption, provide what could be viewed as cyber camouflage; thereby 
strengthening evasive techniques employed by extremists.  Securitising these 
online anonymity tools would essentially provide law enforcement and 
intelligence services with enhanced capabilities, thus reducing the overall 
discreetness found between extremists and their uploaded content in addition to 
the individuals they seek to influence and inspire.   
The purpose of this research topic of choice is to extend upon how digital 
platforms are used in order to strategically advance online self- radicalisation, 
recruitment and enlistment (Khader and Neo, 2016).  In addition to the latter, 
focus on features that are often highlighted in regards to modern examples of 
terrorism is the importance of rapidly advancing and accessible technologies.  
Terrorists acquiring and using these technologies to more effectively promote 
their agenda is a grave national and international security issue (Terrorism 
Analysis 2016).  Furthermore, online self-radicalisation is a source for concern 
which has virtually lead to difficulties withstanding, as well as unsuccessful 
domestic counter measures, within the United States of America.  This 
dissertation aims to not only address the current ubiquitous phenomenon 
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ensuing within the United States (U.S), additionally, it will also discuss, as well 
as investigate, why effectively combating such a harsh reality has momentarily 
proved to be unsuccessful.   
The theoretical framework of this document consists of a detailed 
literature review, further supported by a case study analysis.  Implementation of 
an in-depth literature review appropriately seeks to conceptualise radicalisation, 
its causes, and the various existing models and pathways that have been 
developed beneficial to comprehending its process.  In contrast to previous 
radicalisation models, Angelini’s online self-radicalisation model (AOSRM) 
was developed to shed light on the radicalisation process as it occurs in the cyber 
domain.  The model itself emphasises the individual’s exposure to radical online 
content – also referred to as echo-chamber indoctrination – as well as the social- 
cultural transitions that subsequently take place.  Furthermore, AOSRM’s 
application is not only theoretical, but instead practical; as it provides 
transparency on how an individual(s) may progress towards radicalisation, 
online, in addition to exposing a possible outcome that does not necessarily lead 
to violence - radicalisation into extremism (RE).   
By analysing three cases involving online- radicalisation and terrorism, 
the case study analysis examines the hardship and tedious procedural process 
U.S. authorities occasionally go through in order to fulfill their responsibilities 
during and following an investigation.  In each case the author exploits the 
backgrounds, interests and incentives, of the perpetrator(s).  Criticism and 
admiration is impartially distributed towards the procedural steps taken, or not 
taken, in attempts to countervail online-radicalisation and terrorism.  Moreover, 
the author’s recommendations are offered in hopes of improving a systemic 
problem found within the U.S.  Furthermore, the first two cases undergoing 
analysis highlight the failure’s and success’ directed towards prevention and 
apprehension of a terrorist attack, with the third and final case exemplifying the 
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success of a counter-terrorism operation, in addition to incorporating the 
author’s personalised online self-radicalisation model - AOSRM.  
 The overall rationale behind the case selection is to essentially reveal a 
variation of outcomes among similar, yet unrelated, incidents in addition to 
assessing the parallels and diversity between them.  Accordingly, the first two 
cases that were selected, yield distinct infractions and obedience regarding the 
institutions involved (the FBI, Facebook, Apple, etc.), technologies and 
regulations confronted – concerns critically addressed in the third chapter.  
Likewise, the two cases further provided an uncomplicated analysis on a 
particularly complex topic.  The third case that was selected simply 
demonstrates a coherent pathway towards extremism by means of radical online 
material, and is therefore thoroughly analysed via compatibility with the 
author’s radicalisation model, AOSRM.  Incorporation of the author’s model 
offers insight to the online-radicalisation process; more specifically how it can 
facilitate preemptive awareness and, perhaps, intervention, in further support of 
successfully thwarting terrorism prior to its devastating aftermath. 
Considerably influenced by terrorist organisations, such as the self- 
proclaimed Islamic State (IS), the exploitation of social media and 
recruitment/enlistment of domestic extremists is the result of radical online 
propaganda varied with obsessive regularity and sympathy towards terrorist 
causes (Khader and Neo, 2016).  As a result, criticism is impartially distributed 
towards the procedural steps U.S. legislature and private corporations have 
taken, and have not taken, in attempts to countervail the growing phenomenon 
of online self-radicalisation.  As Michael A. Stefanone states in his expert 
analysis article, “The ultimate utility of social media is to connect like-minded 
individuals…  Today, however, technology enables us to connect globally. Now 
that we can connect globally, there is also greater opportunity to connect with 





Principles of Radicalisation: Literature Review and 
Introduction to Angelini’s Online Self-radicalisation 
Model (AOSRM) 
 
1.1 Defining Radicalisation 
Due to the extremeness of radicalisation, many ponder how an 
individual could adopt such a behavior and, or, beliefs that bolster his or her 
engagement in subversive and terrorist activity.  According to Randy Borum, 
“early efforts attempting to solve this enigma merely took the narrow approach 
by solely focusing on studying the individual(s) behavior” (2011, p. 14).  Since 
the 1960’s, however, academia has further analysed a multitude of terrorist 
activities, as well as their sectional subordinates.  Accordingly, focus of analysis 
has, rather than stay fixated on observing individual behavior, broadened and 
concentrated on various criteria, such as: the individual, group interaction, 
social networks, organisations, mass movement, socio-cultural contexts, and 
even international and interstate contexts.  Therefore, the prior assumption that 
radicalisation of an individual was once due to their aberrant behavior reflecting 
some sort of mental or personality abnormality, has been disproven. Randy 
Borum states, “Fortunately, with very few exceptions, most contemporary 
social scientists studying terrorism have moved past these early, naïve 
assumptions” (2011, p. 14).  Comparable with Borum’s statement, John Horgan 
asserts, “for a long time, there was a widespread assumption that there may exist 
a terrorist personality, and there have been many efforts to engage psychology 
in a technical sense in terms of the development of profiles (e.g. of particular 
types of terrorists such as suicide terrorists, or hijackers, for instance, and more 
recently whether suicide terrorists for example might resemble other kinds of 
mass killers such as school shooters), but as a discipline, psychology has had 
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little to say about terrorist behavior” (2014, p. 3). As a result, radicalisation 
foreshadowing acts of terrorism, is no longer considered a “condition”, so to 
speak.  Instead, terrorism, in relation to its constituent ‘radicalisation’, is now 
viewed as a dynamic process.   
Many who attempt to further understand the concepts and definitions of 
radicalism, face the probability of unintentional conflation between the various 
terminologies and contexts of the word, given the ubiquity of its usage. 
Instances such as this become seemingly recognisable when discussion 
surrounding radicalism and violence start to arise.  The number of attempts on 
creating an absolute definition of the term “radical” are as indistinct as they are 
innumerable.  Similarly, the clarity between the terms “radicalism” and “threat 
radicalism” is also lacking.  According to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
the definition of threat radicalism is as follows: “Extreme views, including 
beliefs that violent measures need to be taken” (2008, N.p).  However, aside 
from the focus surrounding and interrupting the radicalisation process, also 
referred to as radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE), others oppose or, to 
some degree, question the cases involving radicalism and the lack of violence 
associated with them.  In contrast to NIJ and in the context of radical Islam, 
Scott Atran acknowledges a poll taken from ‘Pew and Gallup’, which reports 
that although there is an existence of tens of millions of Muslims worldwide 
who are sympathetic towards Jihadists, most of them do not end up engaging in 
violence (2010, p. 5).   
Although the term “radical”, in addition to “radicalism” and 
“radicalisation”, is often used in discussions regarding terrorism and extremism, 
the word essentially has two types of meaning; one relative and one absolute 
(Sedgwick, 2010).  The relative meaning of the term “radical” is most 
appropriately understood from the Oxford English Dictionary, and states, 
“representing or supporting an extreme section of a party” (2009).  It is in this 
sense, the term may be synonymous with the term “extremist” (Sedgwick, 
2012).  However, when seeking to define “radicalism” in its absolute context, 
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the onset of confusion is often common.  When comparing some of the earlier 
forms of the absolute definitions, such as, ‘‘radicalism is a unified and internally 
consistent interpretation of the world’’ or “when medieval man rebelled, he 
rebelled against the abuses of the lords”, one cannot help but feel as though the 
absolute definition of radicalism is still under development (Bittner, 1963; 
Ortega y Gasset, 1923).  Therefore it is best to refer to its relative subordinate 
for purposes of conceptual clarity. 
Radicalisation as a concept and in terms of violence, also referred to as 
radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE), could essentially be described as 
the processes by which people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify 
violence but compel it, and how they progress—or not—from thinking to action 
(Borum, 2011).  The distinction that should be made when comparing radical 
acts of violence to regular, non- radical, acts of violence, is the presence of 
ideology as a motive.  Although the process of engaging in terrorism or violent 
extremism has been argued to be the product of radicalisation and the 
development of extreme ideologies; radicalising by developing or adopting 
extremist beliefs that justify violence is just one possible pathway into terrorism 
involvement (Borum, 2011).  Furthermore, as research shows that there is not a 
single pathway to RVE, and that the process undergone by one individual may 
not be the same process undergone by another; it is apparent that a single theory 
or discipline will not encapsulate a definitive pathway.  Needless to say, 
identifying and interacting with mechanisms on the micro (individual) and 
macro (social/cultural) levels on a case by case basis is critical in providing 
edification to the radicalisation process, overall (Borum, 2011). 
In addition to the lack of clarity attributed to radicalisation, in terms of 
extreme ideology versus extreme acts of violence, other areas facilitating 
discourse on the topic harbor similar aspects of contextual perplexity (the 
intricate use and context of the term); in that they disagree with how the term 
“radical” is used.  As Mark Sedgwick concedes, the three most important 
official and semi-official contexts in which the term ‘‘radicalisation’’ is 
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presently used in Western nations are the security agenda: intelligence and 
police agencies who are both concerned with radicalisation as a direct or indirect 
threat to the security of the state or of individual citisens of the state; the 
integration agenda: promoting equal membership through desegregation and 
prevention of segregation of previously segregated groups, with specific 
emphasis on avoiding residential and market- segregation; and lastly, the 
foreign-policy agenda: policy makers who are concerned with radicalism both 
directly (similar to the security agenda) and indirectly - through the involvement 
surrounding various benign and allied governments, as well as friendly Arab 
regime (2012, p. 485- 487). In accordance with the contextual perplexity 
surrounding “radicalisation”, as Sedgwick had observed; Veldhuis and Staun 
from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, argues 
that it is, in fact, the apparent absence of a lucid and universally accepted 
definition of the term (radicalism) that has caused so much confusion (2009, 
N.p).  To illustrate this, Veldhuis and Staun state: "Although radicalisation has 
increasingly been subjected to scientific studies, a universally accepted 
definition of the concept is still to be developed. Nevertheless, faced with 
pressure to tackle radicalisation, policy makers have developed a few 
definitions. Definitions of radicalisation most often centre around two different 
foci: (1) on violent radicalisation, where emphasis is put on the active pursuit or 
acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated goal, and (2) on a broader 
sense of radicalisation, where emphasis is placed on the active pursuit or 
acceptance of farreaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute 
a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of 
violence to attain the stated goals” (2009, p. 4).  Respectively, as one enters the 
realm of differing contextual agendas, it is important to note that the author will 





1.2 Defining the Causes and Concepts of Radicalisation 
The central argument behind the concepts of radicalisation is that there 
are various existing contexts (security, integration, and foreign policy) that 
inadvertently convolute the meaning of the word “radicalisation”, or what it 
means to be “radical.”  What tends to be problematic is not the word itself, but 
the suggested “absolute concept” of how the word is applied within the 
discourse of said contexts.  This can be supported by the increase in frequency 
of use of the term “radicalisation” by the press, in years 2005-07 due to the 
emergence of homegrown terrorism (Sedgwick, 2010, p.480).  Previous 
discourse on topics relating to radicalisation leading up to years 2005-07 
consisted of circumstances, ideology, the group and, or, individual.  However, 
over the course of time, negligence to the subject of wider circumstance has led 
to the conflation of groups and individuals.  An example of this would be the 
parallel drawn between Islam and violence, as well as the observable prejudice 
towards how all Islamists are driven by religious principles.  Such assumptions 
aren’t entirely true, therefore, we shall extend upon the differentiating factors 
pertaining to Islam and Islamism, in the context of radicalisation, downstream. 
The number of attempts on creating an absolute definition of the term 
“radical” are innumerable.  Similarly, the clarity between the terms “radicalism” 
and “threat radicalism” is also lacking.  The definition of threat radicalism 
given by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is as follows: “Extreme views, 
including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken” (Hamm, 2008).  This 
is true, however, the opposing argument or question that has been formed, 
rather, is that of the cases that don’t involve any violence.  What about cases 
that do not lead directly to violence, or do not necessarily lead to violence at all?  
For these cases it’s best to rely on the relative yet conceptual meaning of the 
term “radical”, which, in one’s own opinion, happens to be most appropriately 
understood from the Oxford English Dictionary – as previously mentioned, and 
states, “representing or supporting an extreme section of a party” (2009).  It is 
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in this sense, the term may be synonymous with the term “extremist” 
(Sedgwick, 2012).  Such a case will be recognised, as well as analysed later on 
in Chapter 2. 
When discussing the causes of radicalisation, the intentional and 
systematic principles of recruitment often times coexists within the majority of 
discourse taking place.  Although it is lucid that the topic of recruitment shares 
a unique place in the radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) discussion, it 
would be prudent to note that not all individuals who are in fact radicalised fall 
under the process of being recruited.  To illustrate this, Mark Sadgewick goes 
as far as to say, “There is no recruitment per se to armed jihad or Al- Quida” 
(2010, p. 479).  Sedgewick continues to argue that contrarily to recruitment, 
enlistment is predominantly the contemporary mechanism for the emergence of 
new recruits (2010, p. 479).  Despite the synergy between radicalisation and 
recruitment, the radicalisation process is far more intricate.  In essense, 
recruitment may or may not be a specific phase within the overall process 
towards radicalisation, the process itself is entirely unique to individual(s) 
undergoing it.  
Notions relating to radicalisation and involvement in terrorism are 
proposed as an ambiguous set of processes.  To illustrate these processes, 
theories consisting of: social movement, social psychology, and conversion, 
would be the most practical to review, if the objective is to gain tautological 
understanding and comprehension to frameworks that may bare influence over 
terrorism – this will be discussed in further detail later on.  In comparison to 
this, the use of the “radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE)” term may be 
apparent to illustrate and extend upon the process by which people come to 
adopt beliefs that they feel justify violence (Borum, 2011, p. 4).  Alternatively, 
people should not apply the term RVE so carelessly.  This is due to the fact that 
most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, just as all 
terrorists may not be as deeply ideological as they are perceived to be.  For 
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instance, a poll taken from ‘Pew and Gallup’ reveals that although there is 
existence of tens of millions of Muslims worldwide who are sympathetic 
towards Jihadists, most of them do not end up engaging in violence (S. Atran, 
2010, p. 5).   
Theoretical Processes of Radicalisation 
There are many pathways through which radicalisation occurs, each of 
which is affected by a variety of factors. Within this "pathway" or 
"developmental" approach, radicalisation is observed not as "the product of a 
single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes 
an individual toward a commitment to violence over time” (McCormick, 2003, 
p. 475).  An example of this could the online consumption of radical material or 
propaganda by an individual who is sympathetic to extremists abroad.  Simply 
put, prolonged exposure to such material may incentivise an individual to take 
action in favor of violent extremism, thereby self-radicalising and pursuing 
efforts of acceptance among a terrorist organisation – such as IS or Al’ Quida – 
to then carry out similar acts of violence at home or abroad. Moreover, extensive 
research confirms the general proposition that no single pathway or explanatory 
theory exists that would apply to all types of groups, and, or, individuals who in 
fact have become radicalised or are currently on the path towards radicalisation 
(Borum, 2004, N.p).  As Walter Laqueur states, “Many terrorisms exist, and 
their character has changed over time and from country to country” (2003, N.p).  
Such a transformation is equally recognised in the process of radicalisation, 
however, what is even more crucial than the existence of this process is the 
‘how’ factor.  According to Borum, “how do individuals come to not only 
accept, but advocate such violent extremist ideologies, to translate them—or 
not—into justifications or imperatives to use terrorist violence, and choose (or 
choose not) to engage in violent and subversive activity in service of those 
ideologies” (2011, p. 11)? In comparison to this, various frameworks and 
theories do exist that may support and elaborate on particular pathways 
12 
 
throughout the radicalisation process, additionally providing a broader outlook 
on said pathways.  Furthermore, subsequently concluding this section and the 
process of observing such theories, the following information will then be 
applied to home grown radicalisation in the west. 
➢ Social Movement Theory (SMT):  Also referred to as “Strain Theory”, 
according to Borum, this movement arose from irrational processes of 
collective behavior occurring under strained environmental conditions, 
therefore producing a mass sentiment of discontent (2011, p. 17).  Due 
to passively succumbing circumstances as well as overwhelming social 
forces, individuals find no other outlet other than joining such a 
movement.  SMT researchers in the 1980s and 1990s determined that 
the primary task of any organisation and, or, movement is to maintain 
its own survival, thus requiring adherents to collect and maintain a body 
of supporters (Borum, 2011). 
o Klandermans and Oegema suggests that to survive and sustain 
itself, any Social Movement must attend to the following tasks: 
forming mobilisation potential, forming and motivating 
recruitment networks, arousing motivation to participate, 
removing barriers to participation (Klandermans, 1987, p. 520).  
SMT’s can be applied to cases of isolated individuals self- 
radicalising online, due to similar procedural steps taken by 
extremists to replenish expired members by expanding the 
organisation/ movement’s influence and capacity via online 
platforms. 
➢ Social Psychological: Primarily concerns itself with relationships, 
influences, and transactions among people, and particularly group 
behavior.  Because violent extremism is most often a group-related 
phenomenon, social psychology attempts to understand and explain how 
the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals is influenced by the 
actual, imagined, or implied presence of others (Allport, 1954, p. 5).  
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Accordingly, there is a correlation between this theory and echo-
chamber indoctrination, a phase within Angelini’s online self-
radicalisation model which will be discussed shortly.  Essentially, 
however, the template is the same: individuals isolate themselves in an 
online community surrounded by other individuals with similar issues, 
only to reaffirm their own and avoid criticism. 
➢ Conversion Theory: Devotes less focus on the collective movement, and 
more so on the individual process of transforming beliefs and ideologies 
– personal “Coversion” (Borum, 2011, p. 22). It has been speculated that 
theoretical perspectives on conversion have polarised into one of two 
categories: passive, which views the convert as a passive target who has 
been damaged by trauma and, or, has unfulfilled psychological needs, 
and whose will is overpowered by a form of brainwashing for 
indoctrination purposes; and active, which views the convert as a 
rational actor and active seeker, whose decision to join an organisation 
or movement of any kind is an act of uncompromised volition.  (Borum, 
2011; Richardson, 1989).  The application of both mentioned 
perspectives can also be acknowledged in an online atmosphere.  
Resulting in the radically influenced individual to associate with what 
they perceive is the official message of Islam and, or, physically 
converting to the religion as a display of devotion. 
Home Grown Radicalisation in the West 
Home grown terrorism in the Western part of the world has been on 
steady incline for the past decade and a half.  Moreover, home grown terrorism 
can be defined as: acts of violence against civilian and, or, military targets that 
are primarily orchestrated in Western countries – such as Europe and the U.S. - 
in which those committing violence have been born and raised; hence the term 
‘home grown’.  Apart from these individuals being naturally integrated into 
their respected Western societies, with the exception of some remaining isolated 
in ethnic and religious enclaves, public locations, such as: metro stations, 
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airports, restaurants, and night clubs, have all been unfortunate victims of their 
abhorrent agenda.  Alternatively, the more recent immigration of Muslims in 
Western parts of Europe has led to rampant immigration failures.  As a result, 
one notices a prevalence of discriminatory acts against Muslims throughout 
large portions of these modern societies.  Although failure of integration does 
not exacerbate home grown terrorism, it does, however, boost jihadist 
recruitment efforts towards disaffected and marginalised young European 
Muslims.  As for radicalised tendencies, there is no single factor to be 
considered ‘standard’ in the radicalisation process.  What is understood is that 
personal identity, group dynamics, as well as one’s particular values, all play an 
essential role in the transformation process.  In other words, home grown 
radicalisation in the West could be observed as a sociological process.  
However, to further explain the emergence of home grown radicalisation, a 
combination of factors must be taken into consideration.  
 Despite the existence of other forms of radicalisation, Islam seems to be 
the most concerning issue throughout Western society.  Similarly, Islamic 
ideologies are currently prominent and may consist of anti-western propaganda.  
Consequently, it is important to differentiate between both Islam and Islamism.  
In modern day, Islam is said to be a religion that does not promote violence, nor 
encourage hatred on none Muslims (Borum, 2010, p. 10).  Contrarily, Islamism 
has been declared a totalitarian political ideology driven by potent anti-western 
goals, with the intended “conquest of the world by all means” (Borum, 2010, p. 
10).  Be this as it may, radicalisation is inherently personal, as well as may be 
influenced by political, social and, or, religious goals, that are justified by the 
individual as they, he, or she, seem fit. 
As Borum suggests that it seems reasonable to assert that traditional 
recruitment—as the military does with a dedicated budget and personnel—may 
not be notable, it seems nearly indisputable that Islamist militants seek new 
personnel and that they engage in active efforts to influence others to adopt their 
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extremist ideology, which is arguably a broader conceptualisation of 
recruitment (2011, p. 14).  If genuine, Borum adds, “perhaps some of the 
contested differences really lie in how they do it rather than whether they do it. 
The issues cannot be resolved here, but the notion of recruitment has been raised 
both to distinguish it from radicalization and to suggest—as a policy matter—
that there may be some value to considering a broader, rather than a narrower, 
definition of recruitment as it relates to violent extremism” (2011, p. 14). 
As inquiry into radicalisation throughout the west persists, the 
inclination that the process of becoming radicalised and committing acts of 
terrorism is predominantly male oriented is a deceptive outlook.  If one were to 
dive deeper into more contemporary cases of individuals becoming radicalised 
in the Western part of the world, one may notice a recent spike in female 
recruitment to terrorist organisation, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) 
(Saltmans, 2016, p. 174).  Although this may seem like a new phenomenon, it 
has been discovered that women have taken up supportive roles in the 
revolutionary efforts of terrorist groups by virtue or recruitment or enlistment, 
thereby supporting the possibility for further radialisation into extremism or 
violent extremism.  Such information reinforces previous claims that for many 
years’ women have long been a blind spot for security, academic and think tank 
sector, in relation to the growing threat of global extremism (Saltmans, 2016, p. 
174).  “The number of Western foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) and female 
migrants joining ISIS in Iraq and Syria was last estimated at upwards of 4,000, 
with 550 women within this figure” (Barrett, 2014, N.p).  While the internet 
cannot be considered a sole cause of these figures, there is no doubt that online 
platforms, such as: various chat rooms, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and so on, 
have facilitated extremist recruitment and enlistment by virtue of fanatical 
online material and socialisation, in turn stimulating the processes of 
radicalisation (Saltmans, 2016, p. 175).  In order for one to fully conceptualise 
the psycho-social influence terrorist organisations – like IS and Al’ Qaida– bare 
over their future adherents, analysis of various case studies is considered to be 
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ideal.  In the forthcoming chapter, Chapter 3, such case studies to which pertain 
to the United States will be analysed. 
Challenges Sustained Online 
The number of Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) and female migrants 
leaving from Western countries to join IS is unprecedented.  Although 
radicalisation in the U.S. is relatively new, the methods these radicalised 
individuals adopt in order to facilitate their migration is congruent with the 
digital era.    According to Saltman, “The complexities of deciding to migrate 
to join a conflict and planning the logistics of this act, which is inherently illegal 
in the case of IS, is one that is currently facilitated by online communications 
and Internet tools” (2016, p. 183).  With deference to radicalisation by violent 
extremist organisation, it has been observed that the Internet is used in three 
primary ways (Hussain & Saltman, 2014): 
1. Firstly, indoctrination of individuals is achieved through deconstructing 
previous ideology in order to proselytize and re-educate individuals 
towards a particular extremist worldview (Saltman, 2016, p. 180).   
2. Secondly, the Internet serves as a tool for educating the curious about 
extremist ideologies, further providing quick and easily accessible 
learning tools, lectures and educational resources (Saltman, 2016, p. 
180).  
3. Lastly, the Internet is used as a socialisation tool by recruiters, 
solidifying the radical violent ideology by providing a sense of 
community, or echo-chamber; a like-minded social environment and 
propagandised media that conform to various radicalised narratives 
(Saltman & Winter, 2014).   
Janbek and Steinfatt insist that the biggest advantage of such 
communication, is that the messages reach their intended audience, unfiltered, 
by bypassing traditional media outlets (2016, N.p).  However, Neo claims that 
the transition from online to offline violence exposes a grey area that remains 
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poorly understood (2016, p. 201).  Moreover, while many members of violent 
extremist online communities exist, it is only the small minority that become 
engaged in violent extremism (Neo, 2016).  Opinions aside, social media has 
now become the mainstream recruitment platform for online radicals and 
extremists, allowing many IS recruits to find their way to the group in web 
forums and on Twitter, where they can easily connect to fighters and networks 
in Iraq and Syria (Dickinson, 2015; Torok, 2016).  In 2015 alone it was 
estimated that IS had successfully recruited between 16,000 and 17,000 fighters 
from 90 countries (“Legion of Fighters”, 2015).  However, other estimates are 
certain that the number of foreigners joining IS as well as other groups was 
instead around 20,000 (“20,000 foreign fighters”, 2015).  The Internet enables 
one to bypass certain media outlets, thus allowing for terrorist organisations to 
unimpededly broadcast their message.  According to Vidino and Hughes, “as of 
the fall of 2015, U.S. authorities speak of some 250 Americans who have 
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria/Iraq to join the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) and 900 active investigations against ISIS sympathizers in all 50 
states” (2015, p. ix).  Although the number of recruits from the United States 
represents a very small percentage of the overall number of foreign recruits, it 
remains significant and alarming. 
1.3 Existing Models and Pathways of the Radicalisation Process 
As mentioned earlier, the pathway to radicalisation is a dynamic process.  
Similar to other existing processes that are extraneous to ones that could 
eventually result in acts of terrorism, the progression towards radicalisation can 
be divided into segments, or individual phases.  These phases in their entirety 
demonstrate what most researchers refer to as a ‘gradual process’; in which 
individuals’ progress through multiple stages of a particular chain of events at 
varying timeframes, leading up to radicalisation (Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 
2005).  Many of these models have been developed over the years, however, 
their content and structure differ greatly due to perceived variance in the 
radicalisation process, key aspects of radicalisation sought to be emphasised and 
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exposed, in addition to differences of opinion among a number of scholars. 
Despite this, many of these models fail to accentuate the process as it exists in 
the cyber element, rather than its conventional one.  In other words, existing 
models cater to a more generalised form of the process towards radicalisation 
instead of focusing on a contemporary approach, thereby incorporating the role 
of the Internet and the influential use of its numerous online platforms.  
Furthermore, the reviewed models are deficient in unmasking other facets of 
radicalisation distant from committing acts of terrorism, or ‘Jihad’, which seems 
to be the ‘final phase’ in frequent models.  Nevertheless, the models that are to 
be discussed provide vital insight into the radicalisation process, whilst 
simultaneously unveiling multiple viewpoints on the topic as a whole. 
Borum’s four stage model was initially developed to convey to law 
enforcement officials insights into the radicalisation process (Borum, 2003).  As 
shown below in Figure 1, Borum’s model demonstrates a more conceptual 
outlook on the radicalisation process, rather than an empirical one.   







The first and second phase of the model, grievance and injustice, set the tone 
for forthcoming discursive markers, target attribution and 
distancing/devaluation, and can be perceived as a common foundation that is 
acknowledged in various existing models.  Moreover, Borum’s model insists 
that grievances, in addition to exposure to radical discourse, generate hatred 
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towards certain groups, ensuing a final outcome that allows the individual to 
embrace ideologies pertaining to jihad and martyrdom (Borum, 2011). In 
contrast however, the transformation into violent extremism is primarily a 
product of consumption of radical discourses pertaining to jihad and martyrdom, 
rather than ascribing to hate as the main influential factor.  Although Borum’s 
model accomplishes what it initially sought out to achieve, the model itself is 
overly simplistic and incompatible with online self-radicalisation as it does not 
include interaction with the Internet or its platforms.  Furthermore, the purpose 
for its creation – to provide a general radicalisation template to law enforcement 
– hinders the model’s practical application.  Nevertheless, the first phase of the 
model is widely accepted as a sound starting point in the radicalisation process. 
 Moghaddam’s terrorism staircase model (see Figure 2) describes the 
path to terrorism as a set of progressive stages with fewer and fewer individuals 
progressing onto each stage within the staircase (Moghaddam, 2005).  Unlike 
most models, Moghaddam solicits that the first stage an individual embarks on 
in the radicalisation process is a product of personal adversity; subsequently 
outlining violence of action as a first floor option rather than a conclusive one.  
The implication that violence immediately succeeds personal adversity is a flaw 
in the model, due to the sense of idiosyncrasy circulating each particular case 
involving an individual becoming radicalised and, if need be, engaged in 
violence of jihad.  Another issue with this model, again, pertaining to the first 
floor, is that violence of action is considered an option rather than an obligatory 
crusade.  However, in contrast to the efficient staircase structure of the model, 
further supported by the moral aspects related to the transformation into 
terrorism, the psychological connotation throughout this model seems outdated 
if and when applied to contemporary processes of radicalisation.  Therefore, the 
process of radicalisation is no longer focused around an individual’s aberrant 
behavior, but instead has been broadened to encompass a diversified set of 
social and cultural influencing factors. 
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Helfstein’s four stage model, contrary to older models, views the phases 
of radicalisation as a dynamic series, similar to a cycle of events.  This 
contemporary model (see Figure 3) was created based on case studies of 
radicalised individuals and plots of terrorism in the U.S. (Helfstein, 2012).  In 
contrast to previous models, Helfstein argues that radicalisation cannot be 
independently viewed as a social or ideological process; but instead suggests it 
is a “coevolutionary” process that maintains interest in both streams of influence 
(2012, p. 2).  Accordingly, as this model is more recent than the latter, it 
emphasises that Internet sites, YouTube and online magazines convey radical 
ideology, particularly focusing on Facebook and how interaction with the online 
platforms seem to facilitate the institutional process of socialisation (Helfstein, 
2012).  Another important factor can be attributed to individuals who are 
radicalised or prone to radicalisation often had a counterculture background 
(Helfstein, 2012). 
The uniqueness of Helfstein’s model can be credited not so much to the 
sequential order of discursive markers, but rather its regressive characteristics 
as well as its ability to revisit previous stages within the model.  The first stage, 
awareness, involves exposure to radical ideology.  Thereafter, individuals 
progress to the interest phase, willingly permitting the metamorphosis of their 
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belief system.  Here the individual(s) supposedly indoctrinates themselves into 
online institutions, similar to social networks and chat rooms housing people 
with related interests and perspectives.  The acceptance stage, Helfstein claims, 
is where social norms are internalized and violent actions are sanctioned (2012, 
N.p).  Lastly, the implementation stage is where universal action appears.  
Although Helfstein distinguishes between radical and violent radical norms on 
paper, his phase model unsuccessfully makes this distinction (2012, N.p).  
Furthermore, the ceaseless regressive and revisiting function of stages within 
Helfstein’s model can be widely interpreted as ambiguous and controversial.  
One could argue that the model subliminally displays the procedural steps of 
de-radicalisation process without officially recognising its existence through 
inscribed explanation.  







Torok’s explanatory model utilising psychiatric power, interestingly 
enough, is not a phased based model (Torok, 2011, 2013).  Alternatively, it 
examines power relationships online in addition to how discourses are formed 
and propagated online (Torok, 2016, p. 65).  The assumptions underlying this 
model are based around Foucault’s (2006) research; acknowledging the 
utilisation of circular and networked nature of power, in addition to significant 
discourse formation (Torok, 2011, 2013).  The model itself was formulated to 
focus on three critical foundations: outlooks on social media platforms regarded 
as online institutions seeking to isolate and expose individuals to one-
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dimensional discourse; normalisation of extremist discourse, conveyed with 
authority and truth; and, lastly, power is networked with individuals being 
radicalised by various sources consisting of homogenous extreme discourse, 
rather than a single entity (Torok, 2016, p.65).  
 Notwithstanding, Torok’s explanatory model is possibly the most 
contemporary model to date.  However, it is unclear whether the model 
continues to follow the individuals’ induction into extremist thinking.  
Moreover, similar to the lack of transparency surrounding the models outlook 
on extremist thinking, the overall depth of the explanatory model does not 
actually extend that far.  Critical points have been address, like the social media 
environment and its influential power, yet provide no description on how 
individuals interact within it.  Despite the importance of discursive markers and 
how they are related to the process of radicalisation – as Torok points out - this 
model could benefit from an attached phase model, for it would provide visual 
clarity towards the current explanatory model.  Although Torok’s model could 
be more descriptive and visually drawn out, it does refer to current issues other 
models seem to overlook, such as how online institutions tend to isolate people 
with identical interests.  For that reason, Torok’s model seems to be better 
equipped than the other aforementioned models to address radicalisation in its 
contemporary element.  
 I propose an alternative model, Angelini’s online self-radicalisation 
model (AOSRM), which seeks to interpret online radicalisation as a process 
leading up to radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE), yet exposes the 
possibility of an individual not partaking in violent acts of any kind; thereby 
allowing the individual to branch off into what is referred to as radicalisation 
into extremism (RE).  AOSRM was created to provide transparency on the 
online self- radicalisation process.  The phase model starts off with exogenous 
conditions, also referred to as ‘triggering factors’.  These factors, whether they 
are motivations of any kind (economic frustration; political, social, and, or 
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cultural injustices) are completely unique to the individual and may lead to 
curiousness and, or, self-education on matters relatable to oneself.  Sequentially, 
echo-chamber indoctrination follows suit and provides insight into the 
individuals’ online consumption of radical discourse through isolated online 
communities.  This phase goes on to explain that disaffected individuals 
searching for an outlet to self-educate or socialise with people that possess 
similar or identical ideologies and, or, grievances actually turn out isolating 
themselves, in turn, reinforcing commonly held ideas that are safe from 
criticism.  Subsequently, conversion, the third phase in AOSRM, introduces a 
conscious, or sometimes sub-conscious, decision involving identification or 
association with what is to be believed as the message of Islam – also referred 
to as Islamism – and is the radical tipping point in the process.  Justification is 
essentially the last phase in the AOSRM model which ensues radicalisation, 
however, it is the divisions within the phase of justification – RVE and RE - that 
distinguish it from other models.  The divisions establish a precedent that 
reveals how extremists do not always result to violence.  Nevertheless, 
individuals who have progressed to this stage of the model, though they may 
not end up committing or supporting acts of violence, may not necessarily 
disagree with them.  A comprehensive introduction of the author’s contributions 
will be discussed further into the chapter. 
1.4 Angelini’s Online Self-radicalisation Model (AOSRM) 
 The author’s model is a phase based model, similar to many of the 
aforementioned models (see Figure 4).  However, inconsistent with most 
models, the premise for which it was devised is to provide perspective on the 
process of online radicalisation, primarily in the context of radical Islam.  The 
model itself is in fact a portable model that can be applied to many existing 
cases of online radicalisation, however, the particular case the model will be 
applied to in the following chapter highlights an overlooked, if not completely 
neglected, feature of the radicalisation process altogether.  The feature(s), or 
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emotions, which go unrecognised in nearly all phase models, is sympathy and 
empathy portrayed outward towards acts of terrorism.  What differentiates 
AOSRM from alternative models is that it exposes the possibility of the 
individual becoming radicalised, yet not partaking in violent acts of any kind 
and instead branching off into what is referred as radicalisation into extremism 
(RE).  The model also incorporates the radicalisation process leading up to 
radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE), however, it is the radical, non-
violent, aspect of the model, supported by its cyber application that 
distinguishes it from previous models. 
One of the most common trends pertaining to the radicalisation process 
and also discovered at the foundation of the many radicalisation models that 
were covered in the literature review, is the common trend of grievance or 
‘exogenous conditions’ initiating the process.  Although this is a very broad 
starting point in the process, one could argue that the initial reasons for an 
individual to begin down the path of radicalisation is, in itself, contingent upon 
the disturbances interpreted and, or, received by that person(s) at any given time.  
It is for this reason why the author has also included it as the first phase in his 
personal model.  In every case, trigger factors are personal and diverse; 
consisting of, but not limited to: injustices (political, economic, social, cultural, 
etc.), personal adversity, or even something as simple as loss of status, such as 
change in occupation (Bartlett and Miller, 2012).  Vulnerability incites 
susceptibility. It is imperative to include all possibilities of entrance into the 
radicalisation process, no matter how ambiguous, rather than limit the 
assumptions to only a handful of circumstances.  Notwithstanding, development 
and refinement of these circumstances increases as the individual embarks 
further into the radicalisation process. 
 Taking into account that the development of this model has been to 
satisfy online radicalisation, the second phase dwells on the what is arguably 
the most influential and galvanising echelon above all others; the scope of 
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‘echo-chamber indoctrination’.  Simply put, an ‘echo-chamber’ is a 
metaphorical term used to describe communities that have been formed online.  
Additionally, these communities are occupied by like-minded individuals who 
interact with one another in order to validate a particular set of beliefs 
(Bowman-Grieve, 2013; Thomas Mcgarty, & Louis, 2014).  Similarly, echo-
chamber indoctrination is the phase when the individual begins to isolate 
themselves online in order to further one’s radical perspective.  Due to the fact 
that online social interaction is considered to be more compelling and persuasive 
than physically receiving information, further supported by one-sided narratives 
that bolster imperviousness to contrary sources and opinions, the echo-chamber 
indoctrination phase strengthens the bond between the individual and the wider 
radical movement (Duarte, 2007; Hussain & Saltman, 2014; Neo, 2016).  An 
example of this is Facebook’s ability to suggest posts that are congruent with a 
user’s standpoints, allowing the technology to align itself with preexisting 
beliefs favored by the individual (Bermawy & Mostafa, N.d).  Nevertheless, to 
facilitate the transmittance of factual information, one could argue that diversity 
of opinion is necessary for impartiality and objectivity to occur; echo chambers, 
like those occurring in Facebook, inhibited this type of outlook. Analogous to 
other phases within the radicalisation process, the length of echo-chamber 
indoctrination is determined by the individual undergoing the overall process. 
 As Torok demonstrates, “embedding an individual within a group of 
radicalised individuals and beginning the intensification process is critical in 
gaining a full commitment or self- identification” (Torok, 2016, p. 64).  
Likewise, many of the sites utilised by terrorist organisations, including various 
forms Western social media, have become much more media savvy; targeting 
and appealing to marginalised and disaffected youths (Torok, 2016, p. 41).  
Thus, “given that the Internet is difficult to regulate and censor, the creators of 
radical online medium are therefore able to portray an image which will 
inculcate a more extreme perspective of the enemy by generating more 
arguments favoring their biased position and isolate the community members 
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from any alternative moral interpretation” (Neo, 2016, p. 210).  This sort of 
enclosed atmosphere is well suited for recruiting and radicalising individuals 
who insist on continuing forward.   
Although it has been argued that indoctrination and conversion are 
synonymous, in order for one to justify a particular set of actions, whether it be 
consciously or subconsciously, the individual must first be indoctrinated in 
order for full commitment and self- identification to occur.  However, 
conversion, the identification or association with what is to be believed as “the 
message of Islam”, is also a phenomenon that is consciously or subconsciously 
driven by the individual, yet distinct to the outsider.  Interestingly enough, 
studies show that it is in fact individuals who misunderstand Islam who are more 
susceptible to radicalisation alternatively to those with a more detailed 
understanding (Schmid, 2013).  Conversely, however, another case study 
exhibited radicalisation of an individual who possessed extensive knowledge of 
Islam (Torok, 2016).  
Conversion, the third phase in the author’s model, is the radical tipping 
point leading up to justification.  It is the final phase prior to being morally or 
physical engaged in acts of terrorism.  This stage normally results in 
consolidating one’s thoughts and, or, the possible subscription to radical Islam. 
Also referred to as a ‘cognitive opening’, the individual contemplates the need 
to change one’s worldview in order to make sense of one’s existence (Schmid, 
2013).    Conversion is an intermediate stage assembled in a very imprecise and 
lengthy process, whilst occupying an unaccountable amount of the individual’s 
time.  However, clear indications that someone may possibly be approaching 
this segment in the online-radicalisation process could be the public notion of 
religious convergence, similar to practicing and preaching the doctrine of Islam 
on a public forum; uncommon adjustments in social interactions, corresponding 
to possible radical topics of conversation; relative deprivation, parallel to 
personal isolation; and, or, alteration to one’s social identity, which is identical 
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to disconnecting from those who do not support one’s ideology and, or, do not 
hold the same religious values (Precht, 2007; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).  
The last phase in the author’s model, ‘justification’, is the final phase of 
the online radicalisation process which illustrates the now inherent decision the 
individual is faced with.  Dissimilar from other models, the author’s model 
essentially emphasises that the individual who manages to justify his or her 
radical ideology, is confronted with an ultimatum which allows the model itself 
to branch off into: active physical engagement – radicalisation into violent 
extremism (RVE) – or heartfelt sympathy and, or, empathy directed towards the 
vicious acts of terrorism committed and, or, the terrorist(s) themselves - 
radicalisation into extremism (RE).  Despite the comparable traits among the 
two terms, the overall distinction between RVE and RE is the functions 
associated with their application.  From the justification phase, RVE can take 
an upwards of several weeks or months to consummate, and ultimately results 
in all aspects of physical engagement in terrorist activities; whether it’s an 
infantry role (direct engagement with the alleged enemy) or combat support 
(medical expertise, propaganda distributor, communications specialist, etc.).  
Furthermore, the candidate(s) who are attracted to the physically engaged role 
of extremism typically possess the following characteristics: a strong emotional 
pull to act in the face of injustice, a strong sense of thrill or excitement with 
action, an internal code of honor, and, or, they have been affected by peer 
pressure (Horgan, 2014, p. 79).  
RE on the other hand, applies to the cases that don’t involve acts of 
violence.  Seemingly enough, an individual may accept his/her duty to jihad or 
terrorism in general, yet might not progress to the vengeful branch of RVE.  
Recent studies show that roughly 300 American and, or, U.S.-based IS 
sympathisers active on social media, distributing propaganda, and interacting 
with like-minded individuals (Vidino & Hughes, 2015). Moreover, some 
members of RE eventually transition from keyboard warriors to RVE 
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candidates; however, lack of opportunity, contacts or resources, insufficient 
expertise, or even surveillance concerns from law enforcement, are just a few 
reasons why an individual would be unsuccessful in plotting acts of terrorism, 
or not even attempt to plot such acts in the first place; thus depriving them of 
reaching RVE (Torok, 2016; Vidino & Hughes, 2015).  In other words, as Torok 
states, “a radicalised individual will not necessarily become a terrorist” (2016, 
p. 62).  Inversely, the steps an individual must take to reach RVE are those that 
would essentially restrict individuals in RE to progress forward; whether the 
reasons be voluntary or compulsory.  Furthermore, the model is unidirectional 
due to the dogmatic aspect of extremism.  Once an individual justifies his/her 
initiate, the only methods to reverse their way of thinking would need to be 
found in a de-radicalisation program and, or, from cooperation within the 
community to which they newly identify and support.  In the context of the U.S., 
both options seem equivocal and unstable. 
What is normally affirmed in most radicalisation models is the notion 
that all individuals who fall under the umbrella term ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ 
must, at some point during the radicalisation process, partake in acts of violence.  
Contrary to the following misconception, as stated earlier, the opposite is true: 
most people who hold radical ideas do not actually engage in terrorism.  This 
excluded talking point is well-represented in the author’s model, thus 
contributing to its overall originality and uniqueness as a model pertaining to 
the galvanisation of Internet radicals.  The author’s model does not seek to 
provide a definitive answer of predisposition; rather, it aspires to provide insight 
into a crucial yet inattentive element of the online-radicalisation process.  One 
that is mission-critical when making decisions based on how to reduce, or at 
least efficiently identify, the individuals who are most likely to travel down this 














Obstacles in Countering Online Self- radicalisation: 
Case Study Analysis and Implementation of “AOSRM” 
 
By analysing three cases involving online- radicalisation and terrorism, 
this chapter examines the hardship and tedious procedural process U.S. 
authorities occasionally go through in order to fulfill their responsibilities 
during and following an investigation.  It also brings to light the unfortunate 
outcome when said officials are deprived of quintessential resources, inclusive 
of confrontation with obstinate behavior and refusal of entry into private 
technologies produced by private corporations.  Moreover, the case study 
analysis seeks to essentially unmasked and emphasise the harsh reality of when 
civil liberties interfere with the future safety of the American people.   
In each case the author exploits the backgrounds, interests and 
incentives, of the perpetrator(s).  Criticism and admiration is impartially 
distributed towards the procedural steps taken, or not taken, in attempts to 
countervail online-radicalisation and terrorism.  Moreover, the author’s 
recommendations are offered in hopes of improving a systemic problem found 
within the U.S.  Furthermore, the first two cases undergoing analysis highlight 
the failure’s and success’ directed towards prevention and apprehension of a 
terrorist attack, with the third and final case exemplifying the success of a 
counter-terrorism operation, in addition to incorporating the author’s 
personalised online self-radicalisation model - AOSRM.  The overall rationale 
behind the case selection is to essentially reveal a variation of outcomes among 
similar, yet unrelated, incidents in addition to assessing the parallels and 
diversity between them.  Correspondingly, the first two cases that were selected, 
in one’s own opinion, yield distinct infractions and obedience regarding the 
institutions involved (the FBI, Facebook, Apple, etc.), technologies and 
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regulations confronted – concerns critically addressed in the third chapter.  
Likewise, the two cases further provided an uncomplicated analysis on a 
particularly complex topic.  The third case that was selected simply 
demonstrates a coherent pathway towards extremism by means of radical online 
material, and is therefore thoroughly analysed via compatibility with the 
author’s radicalisation model, AOSRM.  Incorporation of the author’s model 
offers insight to the online-radicalisation process; more specifically how it can 
facilitate preemptive awareness and, perhaps, intervention, in further support of 
successfully thwarting terrorism prior to its devastating aftermath. 
2.1 San Bernardino Massacre (Failure)  
The San Bernardino terrorist attack, which took place in San Bernardino, 
California, on December 2, 2015, is arguably one of the most unsuccessful 
counter-terrorism operations having ever taken place in the United States (U.S.).  
As one fully examines the substantial evidence that was gathered from this 
unfortunate case, the overwhelming preservation of civil liberties and Fourth 
Amendment rights, in addition and in relation to the United States’ obligation 
to uphold and maintain the highest levels of national security, could instead be 
viewed as a systemic problem within the U.S., as preference to improve upon 
one issue inadvertently interrupts the progress of the other.  Littered throughout 
this case are aspects of: preemptive negligence; advanced technological features 
owned by private corporations that decelerate proper evidence procurement; and 
failure of compliance by reason and in interest of customer privatisation as well 
as protection against implicit surveillance.  The analysis of this study does not 
set out to demonstrate which party is right or wrong, rather it exploits certain 
flaws in the current U.S. system; flaws that could make the difference between 
successful prevention of future terrorist plots or enduring repetitive outcomes 
of belated investigations. 
Rizwan Farook: male, 28 years of age and Chicago native; and Tashfeen 
Malik: female, 29 years of age and Pakistani native; were individuals who 
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underwent a ‘sham’ marriage in order to carry out what is to be considered one 
of the most deadly mass shootings and acts of terrorism to ever take place in the 
U.S. (Chang, 2016).  Armed with .223 AR-15 semi-automatic rifles, 9mm semi-
automatic pistols, pipe bombs and a rented sports utility vehicle (SUV) they 
used as a getaway vehicle, together the couple managed to claim the lives of 
fourteen innocent people, whilst injuring an upwards of twenty-four (Rosenfeld, 
N.d, N.p).  The targeted attack took place at a San Bernardino County 
Department of Public Health training event and Christmas party.  Leading up to 
the shooting, Farook himself was a health inspector for the company.  Up until 
recently the motives for the attack were still under investigation.  Now, 
however, authorities claim that the perpetrators were inspired by Islamic 
terrorists and terrorist organisations, more specifically by means of ‘online 
propaganda’ (Mozingo, 2016).  Although the events leading up to final outcome 
of the attack are inherently significant, our main focus of analysis will be fixated 
on the pathway to radicalisation and terrorism, the investigation, and the U.S. 
policy response.  
In mid- December, 2015, James Comey, director of the FBI, had stated, 
"We can see from our investigation that in late 2013, before there is a physical 
meeting of these two people [Farook and Malik] resulting in their engagement 
and then journey to the United States, they are communicating online, showing 
signs in that communication of their joint commitment to jihadism and to 
martyrdom. Those communications are direct, private messages” (Baker, 2015; 
Lewis, 2015).  Comey went on to speak about how the FBI's investigation had 
revealed that the perpetrators were "consuming poison on the Internet" and both 
had become radicalised "before they started courting or dating each other 
online" and "before the emergence of ISIL” (Lewis, 2015; Martinez, 2015).  
What the investigation also revealed and what has been a controversial topic of 
discussion since publicised, was Apple’s rejection to meeting the demands of 




As with most modern telecommunication devices, Apple’s IPhone is 
protected by state of the art encryption.  The encryption that the company uses 
is so advanced and privacy oriented, Apple itself cannot access an individual’s 
phone without the individual personally divulging his/her four-digit pin number.  
In terms of privacy, Apple upholds the security of all customers to the highest 
regard.  For law enforcement officials, however, this type of security is a serious 
inhibitor for successful procurement of all, relative, information pertaining to 
this case and future speculated cases.  That being said, the content on Farook’s 
phone was considered highly valuable and mission-critical to the then ongoing 
investigation conducted by the FBI.  In spite of the four-digit PIN set up on 
Farook’s phone, there had been 10,000 possible combinations one would need 
to input in order to gain access to the phone (Williams, 2016).  “Yet once a 
device is locked, the only way to unlock it is by entering a passcode; thus, the 
data will be erased once ten incorrect attempts have been made” (Williams, 
2016).  The FBI’s inquiry about the matter was simple: alter the phone’s security 
protocol, allowing for an unlimited amount of passcode attempts and, or, allow 
the bureau the option to “brute force” attack the phone in furtherance of 
speeding up the PIN deciphering process (Williams, 2016). 
The government went as far as to invoke the ‘All Writs Act of 1789’.  
Consequently, Apple contested and rejected the court order that was issued to 
them, as they are more concerned with the long term effects of creating a back 
door in the phone’s operating system, thereby entertaining the possibility of 
unpermitted investigative intrusions for future cases that are similar in nature.  
Drafted as ‘A Message to Our Customers’, a letter produced by Tim Cook, CEO 
of Apple, says, “The United States government has demanded that Apple take 
an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose 
this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand” (2016).  
Respectfully, Wayne Williams, author of the article ‘Why apple is right to reject 
the order to unlock a killer’s phone’, agrees, “Apple is right to reject this court 
order, because what is at stake is too valuable to lose. The government is 
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essentially asking Apple to eliminate a crucial feature of iPhone security, and 
create a master key that can unlock any Apple device… The government wants 
us to trust that it will only use this power for good -- to protect its citizens from 
the bad guys -- but there’s no way this backdoor won’t be misused and abused” 
(2016).  This is a logical argument that does raise concerns that were previously 
discovered to have happened in the past.  In reference to Chapter 1, the 
ambiguity surrounding the NSA’s informal ability to use ‘back door’ 
approaches in support of breaking through and autonomously monitoring 
domestic encrypted traffic, had many Americans, especially the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), openly distraught (Schneier, 2007; Soghoian, 2010). 
As Time Cook further states, “the government is asking Apple to hack 
our own users and undermine decades of security advancements that protect our 
customers -- including tens of millions of American citizens -- from 
sophisticated hackers and cybercriminals. The same engineers who built strong 
encryption into the iPhone to protect our users would, ironically, be ordered to 
weaken those protections and make our users less safe” (2016).  Interestingly 
enough, Apples’ refusal to remove security features and add new capabilities to 
the operating system, in the sense of protecting their customers data, only 
incited the FBI to take matters into their own hands by hiring professional 
hackers – grey hats - to do it for them.  All data and privacy breaches Apple 
aimed to prevent, was, in fact, self-induced by their noncompliance.  Moreover, 
rather than provide technical oversight and hands on expertise on issues related 
to the security bypass, they were instead excluded and no longer consulted 
during the investigation on account of insubordination.  This is problematic for 
one major reason: The professional hackers who discovered the previously 
unknown software flaw, along with the FBI, have now found a back door into 
Apples’ operating systems that Apple itself was unaware of.  As it stands, both 
parties can choose whether or not to disclose the vulnerabilities to Apple.  
However, since the U.S. is vastly interconnected and dependent of digital 
infrastructure, when these types of vulnerabilities are in fact discovered and 
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could potentially compromise mobile devices owned by many law abiding 
citizens, it is safe to assume a very strong bias towards disclosure (Nakashima, 
2016; Williams, 2016). Consequently, however, by disclosing such information, 
the FBI and elected officials risk the chance of Apple patching the flaw, 
subsequently deteriorating any progress made. 
When having to balance civil liberties and national security, one could 
make the justification on both national security and on law enforcement grounds 
and argue that the software flaw could possibly amplify surveillance 
capabilities, allowing law enforcement to discretely sift through tele-
communicative extremist behavior, in turn, protecting more people in the near 
and distant future (Nakashima, 2016).  The urgency for national security and 
privacy are two constitutional precepts.  However, in contrast to the U.S’ 
dependency on digital infrastructure, if some form of partisanship is to exist, it 
will most likely be focused towards national security.  To illustrate this view 
United States Congressman, Trey Gowdy, concedes, “you do have the freedom 
to speech, you do have the right to have the government seek a warrant in most 
instances, and you do have the freedom of a jury trial and afforded council; and 
not a single one of those rights is much use to you if you’re dead” (2017). 
As further stated in Cook’s letter, “the implications of the government’s 
demands are chilling. If the government can use the All Writs Act to make it 
easier to unlock your iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s 
device to capture their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy 
and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, 
access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access 
your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge” (2016).  Despite 
the fact that the NSA was guilty of similar intrusive acts, crafting the 
comparable narrative that the FBI will follow suit is highly improbable for a 
number of reasons.  Firstly, given the nature of work that is actually required by 
qualified, properly vetted, individuals and agents, the amount of resources 
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needed to do what is implied by Apple is unrealistic.  The FBI is already 
perplexed with attempting to focus on one key element of investigation(s): the 
conservancy of all possible resources dedicated to the cause of threat 
prevention.  Secondly, it would be wise to assume the FBI, when faced with the 
same responsibility, need not be compared, nor share the same fate, as the NSA.  
Rather, they would most likely improve upon past failures and mistakes, whilst 
simultaneously upholding the utmost integrity associated with the privacy of 
individuals.    
Accordingly, one of the arguments referenced on numerous occasions is 
the complex legal issues and obscurity surrounding the federally invoked ‘All 
Writs Act’.  Eric Limer states, “The legal issues around the All Writs Act are 
complex, but at its core, it gives federal judges the power to issue orders to 
compel people to do things within the limits of the law” (2016, N.p).  What is 
considered to be of larger concern for most, however, is the age and broadness 
of the statute itself.  The statute being applied to the Apple case reads, “The 
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law” (All Writs Act 1789).  Furthermore, the act 
was originally apart of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and, aside from being signed 
into law by President George Washington himself, it has been argued to be 
outdated if and when applied to cases regarding modern technology (Limer, 
2016, N.p).  Contrarily, the broadness of the law seems to preserve its relevance 
and overall application, thereby allowing it to keep up with technological 
advancements, such as universal encryption.  Nevertheless, The All Writs Act 
does have its limits.  To illustrate this, back in 2005, a federal judge ruled that 
The All Writs Act was prohibited from forcing a phone company to allow real-
time tracking without a warrant (Benner & Lichtblau, 2016).  
In reference to The Economist article, “The myth of cyber- security”, 
terrorist attacks such as this, often yield debate directed towards weakening 
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encryption methods so that security services, like the FBI, can better monitor 
what individuals are doing (2017, p.9).  It is an impossible task, however, to 
weaken encryption on devices used solely by terrorists (The Economist, 2017).  
Moreover, computer and mobile security is best served by encryption that is 
strong for everyone, not just the presumable benign (The Economist, 2017).  
Alternatively, the government revealing the founded vulnerabilities within 
Apple’s operating system, is a double-edged-sword.  Naturally, Apple is going 
to repair any and all bugs, thereby forcing law enforcement officials to have no 
choice but to start from a foundational level of cracking mobile encryption in 
future cases (Nakashima, 2016). 
Apple’s uncooperativeness towards assisting the government with 
evidence procurement in this particular case, underlines one of the main issues 
the law enforcement agencies are faced with when conducting investigations.  
An increase in communication and cooperation between public and private 
partnerships (PPP’s) is critical in efforts to successfully combat online-
radicalisation and terrorism.  Private corporations, like Apple, must be more 
consciously aware of the vindictive sentiment and violent dialogue being 
exchanged and communicated via use of their product(s) and, or, platforms.  
Perhaps establishing privately funded corporate counter-terrorism unit(s), 
outfitted to combat, reduce, or flag extreme dialogue held between individuals 
and serve as a buffer to law enforcement, would be the most feasible and 
efficient approach in reducing the domestic mobilisation between radicals.  
Such an establishment would serve to avoid expending unnecessary funds 
granted by U.S tax payers that cannot seem to neutralise the demand at an equal 
rate as these instances occur. 
 
 
2.2 Boston Beheading Plot (Successfully Thwarted)  
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In June, 2015, Boston- area resident, Usaama Rahim, 26, plotted to 
behead Pamela Geller, an American political activist and commentator, known 
for her anti-Islamic writings.  Preceding his plotted attack, Rahim divulged to 
his nephew, David Wright, also known as Dawud Sharif Abdul Khaliq, that he 
instead planned on beheading Massachusetts police officers, as his initial target 
proved too difficult of a task.  However, leading up to the attempted arrest and 
fatal neutralisation of Rahim, the FBI conceded that Rahim was in fact under 
twenty-four hour surveillance since late May, 2015, after he bought three knives 
on ‘Amazon.com’ (Bidgood & Philipps, 2015).  A third man, Nicholas 
Rovinski, was later discovered, arrested and convicted alongside Wright, for 
conspiracy to support IS (Bidgood, 2015; Brumfield, 2015; Ryan, 2015).  
Similar to the San Bernadion case, the prevented attack originated from 
the perpetrators consumption of extremist material via online social media 
platforms.  As the chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, 
Representative Michael McCaul, points out, Rahim had been under 
investigation in consequence of “communicating with and spreading ISIS 
propaganda online” (Bidgood & Philipps, 2015).  Furthermore, in accordance 
to CNN, “an analysis of his Twitter feed indicates he actively reached out to 
individuals connected with ISIS, including Mujahid Miski, the online alias of 
Mohamed Abdullahi Hasan, a Minnesotan believed to be fighting with Al-
Shabaab in Somalia” (Brumfield & Sanchez, 2015).  Dissimilar from the San 
Bernardino Case, however, aside from this case over accentuating the influence 
foreign extremists impose on homegrown radicals, the inquisitiveness of the 
FBI, further supported by their ability to successfully neutralise a confronted 
hostile - which resulted in no collateral damage or casualties – can and is 
attributed to a collective approach towards auspiciously combating online-
radicalisation.   
In contrast to the FBI’s success in this particular case, many arguments 
can be developed when comparing the intricacy of variables confronted in the 
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San Bernardino case verses the Boston Beheading Plot.  For example, in the San 
Bernardino case, the perpetrators were well-organised and possessed a 
translucent, strategically conducted, plan on how they were to execute their 
attack as well as how they were to subsequently flee the scene of the crime.  
Moreover, the perpetrators in San Bernardino, in addition to garnering semi-
automatic weapons, pipe bombs and a getaway vehicle, were more precautious 
on how they communicated to one another leading up to the attack.  Although 
online communications held between the married couple were monitored 
attentively, the prolonged de-encryption of encrypted devices produced by a 
leading global telecommunications provider –Apple, along with the formulated 
concerns pertaining to the government’s infringement on civil liberties, played 
a significant role in obstructing the swift investigations of the FBI.  On the 
contrary, in regards to the Boston Beheading Plot, the assailant, Rahim, had a 
highly anticipated and one dimensional variation of assertiveness.  From his 
initial flagged purchase of three knives off of ‘Amazon’, to his frequent 
monitored calls to his nephew, revealing his volatile arrangements focused 
towards “those boys in blue” (referencing police officers), Rahim was 
scrutinised from the very beginning of his hopeful endeavor.  Therefore, one 
could argue that the investigative efficiency of the FBI recognised throughout 
the Boston Beheading Plot, in opposition to San Bernardino, originated from 
the exiguous amount of variables and depth encountered throughout the cases 
existence (Allen & Valencia, 2015). 
The insufficient resources, impulsive attitude and disorganisation of 
Rahim precipitated a great degree of carelessness, to which culminated the 
precision and sufficiency of the bureau.  Intentions initially discovered via 
online-surveillance, followed by successful roving wiretaps, accelerated the 
prevention of what could have been a gruesome terrorist plot.  As an appropriate 
result, the ‘Boston Beheading Plot’ is, in one’s own opinion, the textbook 
example of how counter-terrorism/online-radicalisation operations should be 
conducted, in addition to providing conclusive transparency focused around the 
40 
 
results induced by the proper amount of cooperation and resources distributed 
to all necessary areas of the then ongoing investigation.  It comes with no 
surprise that the successfulness of this investigation and absent attrition of the 
targeted individual(s) – in this case, the police officers - can be attributed to 
procedural excellence, swift methodologies applied by law enforcement 
officials and the avoidance of impeding factors through public and private 
partnerships. 
 2.3 Mississippi Islamic State Recruit, Jaelyn Young (Applied 
Radicalisation Model)  
In this particular case study, former Mississippi chemistry major, Jaelyn 
Young, had more than most could dream of.  Back in high school, Jaelyn had 
been a cheerleader, a distinguished honors student, and homecoming maiden. 
However, despite all of her accolades, the ubiquitous patriotism existing in her 
family – her father being a police officer and U.S. Navy veteran - and to what 
some may consider a privileged upbringing, all of it was unsatisfactory in the 
alluring efforts of the Islamic States (IS) agenda.  On March 28th, 2016, the 
former Vicksburg, Michigan, resident pleaded guilty in federal court to one 
count of conspiring to provide material support to IS, and was to be sentenced 
at a later date (Fox News, 2016).  Her fiancé and fellow extremist sympathiser, 
Muhammad Dakhlalla, was also sentenced for personal charges filed against 
him. “After Jaelyn converted to Islam in March, 2015, is when she began 
wearing a burqa and distancing herself from non-Muslim friends.  Prosecutors 
said she “began to express hatred for the U.S. government” and expressed 
“support for the implementation of Sharia Law in the United States”” (The 
Associated Press, 2016). 
 What is apparent and stated in the previous paragraph is this sort of self-
manifested hatred and spitefulness Young forcefully directs towards the west, 
particularly the United States.  What is uncertain, however, is what methods 
were used in recruiting or coercively enlisting Young into the ranks of IS.  
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Nevertheless, it would be safe to assume – seeing as Young had no prior 
affiliation with any foreign or domestic jihadists – that she was in fact 
influenced by IS propaganda through open source information retrieved via 
online platforms.  Interestingly enough, the pathway in which Young took to 
become radicalised fully developed in under a twelve month period. Although 
Young and her fiancé were arrested on the 8th of August, before boarding a flight 
from Columbus, Mississippi, with tickets for Istanbul and the incentive of 
traveling to Syria; she did not present any future signs of amenability towards 
committing violent acts of terrorism.  However, Young was in fact sympathetic 
towards jihadists with extremely violent aims towards the U.S.  Per Young’s 
social media account, “What makes me feel better after watching the news is 
that an akhi (the Arabic word for “my brother”) carried out an attack against US 
marines in TN! Alhamdulillah, the numbers of supports are growing…” (Fox 
News, 2016).  Furthermore, “prosecutors said Young approvingly cited a video 
of a man accused of being gay being thrown off a roof to his death by militants. 
She also expressed joy at the shooting of five members of the military in 
Chattanooga, Tenn., by an Islamic militant in July” (The Associated Press, 
2016). 
  In addition to this type of mentality, along with Young’s incentive of 
traveling to Syria with hopes of becoming a medic for IS, it is irrefutable that 
‘Angelini’s Online Self-radicalisation Model’, also referred to as AOSRM, is 
the most practical phase model for this case (see Figure 1).  Despite her initiative 
drafted purely by international events as well as political narratives, Young’s 
behavior towards individuals was influenced by the actual, imagined, and 
implied presence of others – in the context of her relationship with her fiancé, 
as well as connoted extremist propaganda found online (Fox News, 2016).  
Young was arguably less focused on the collective movement of IS, and more 
so involved in the individual process of transforming beliefs and ideologies.  
Furthermore, Young’s case does not engage in any form of Islam.  It does, 
however, introduce the fundamental stages of Islamism.  Consequently, 
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although Young held radical ideas and with that should be held accountable for 
her actions, one should have never anticipated her being awarded a combat 
position within the ranks of IS; but instead, a supportive role (medic) – as stated 
earlier.  Though one can only speculate, Young reinforces the notion that all 
terrorists may not be as deeply ideological as they are perceived to be.  
Therefore, in accordance with AOSRM, I believe this classifies Young as 
radicalised into extremism (RE). 
 By examining this case in a more detailed manner whilst simultaneously 
applying the AOSRM phase model, a synergistic clarity is recognised.  In order 
to understand how Young reached the point of RE, and why she is in fact 
classified as RE and not RVE, one must first observe the exogenous conditions 
Young was faced with at the very beginning of her delinquent path towards 
radicalisation.  As it turns out, Young was primarily influenced by the 
consumption of open source material found via online sites.  It was 
acknowledged that Young increasingly complained about the mistreatment of 
Muslims in the United States and United Kingdom (The Associated Press, 
2016).  To support this, The Associated Press states, “Prosecutors said that, after 
watching pro-Islamic State group videos, she began to view the fighters as 
liberators” (2016).  Appropriately and conveniently understood in this precise 
moment, Young is considered to be fluidly matriculating from the exogenous 
conditions to which she has been exposed - in this case what is to be her 
interpretation of various injustices associated with the mistreatment of Muslims, 
domestically and abroad – thereby fueling her with the incentive to stay well-





Figure 1. Angelini’s Online Self-radicalisation Model 
Continuing onward from the initial triggering factor(s), Young 
reinforces her growing concerns with online IS propaganda, much like the pro-
Islamic State group videos that were previously mentioned, thus becoming self-
absorbed.  It would be wise to assert that at this point in time, either consciously 
or subconsciously, Young has entered echo-chamber indoctrination, the second 
phase of AOSRM.  In this phase of the process, there is limited information 
available on how Young’s situation progressed leading up to her religious 
conversion.  What is known, however, is that the entire radicalisation process 
took Young less than twelve months to complete (see Figure 2).  To illustrate 
this, “an FBI affidavit filed in the Young/Dakhlalla case does not discuss how 
the two came to form their positive views about the extremist group. But it does 
suggest that they failed to make contact with an actual recruiter, or at least that 
any Islamic State recruiter they did make contact with did not believe they were 
genuine in their desire to join group” (Richey, 2015).  With echo-chamber 
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indoctrination being the most influential stage in the radicalisation process, it is 
presumably where Young spent the majority of her development. 
Echo-chamber indoctrination is when the so called ‘enlisted’ and, or, 
‘recruited’ individual(s) begins to isolate themselves via online with like-
minded individuals in order to validate a particular set of beliefs from others 
that do not share their evolving perspective.  In correspondence with this tenant, 
Young followed suit when she met Mohammad Oda Dakhlalla and the two first 
started dating November, 2014.  Moreover, it is doubtful that Dakhlalla did not 
further compel Young to convert to Islam, or at the very least support her 
decision, as it has been revealed by means of testimony that he himself is a 
Muslim and had been accused of being Young’s “hijjrah” partner - a common 
reference to journeying to the Islamic State (U.S.A v. YOUNG & 
DAKHLALLA, 2015).  To support this claim, The Associated Press reports, 
“by the time Young began dating Dakhlalla in November 2014, she was already 
interested in converting to Islam.  She announced her conversion in March and 
began wearing a burqa, a garment worn by some Muslim women to cover their 
face and body” (2016).  In reference to AOSRM, in addition to what is gathered 
from the evidence at hand, one notices that Young’s progression from echo-
chamber indoctrination to conversion takes roughly three months to undergo.  
This step not only demonstrates her overall commitment to what she believes is 
the true and undisputed message of Islam, given the online material she has been 




Figure 2. Young’s radicalisation timeline 
Young’s misinterpretation of Islam and its doctrine is overwhelmingly 
attributed to her prompted susceptibility towards the pertinent fundamentalist 
mentality.  Proportionately, this form of Islamism has situated her in the third 
phase of AOSRM, thereby yielding the radical tipping point leading up to 
justification.  “"After her conversion, Young distanced herself from family and 
friends and felt spending time with non-Muslims would be a bad influence," 
prosecutors wrote in a statement of facts regarding Dakhlalla's plea” (The 
Associated Press, 2016).  Jaelyn Young’s subscription to radical Islam 
exacerbated her rational, extending it passed dialogue into a cooperatively 
devised plot to abet IS.  Therefore, Young’s perpetual yearn to join IS, 
expressed support for Sharia Law to be implemented in the U.S and belief that 
IS had established a genuine caliphate, allows her to justify the path she feels 
destined to be on.  
Justification, as observed in AOSRM, branches off into the following 
divisions: radicalisation into extremism (RE) and radicalisation into violent 
extremism (RVE).  With that said, in regards to the transpired events facilitated 
by Young leading up to her and Dakhlalla’s airport arrival, in attempts to board 
a flight to Istanbul, Turkey, classifying this case as ‘RE’ is the most appropriate 
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assessment.  Comparable to the AOSRM phase model, Young willingly and 
undisputedly accepted her duty to jihad and terrorism, however, did not progress 
to the branch of RVE.  This can be supported by Young admitting to organising 
the entire operation: “I found the contacts, made arrangements, planned the 
departure,” prosecutors said she wrote to her family in a “farewell letter” last 
August. “I am guilty of what you soon will find out” (Fox News, 2016).  The 
argument that is to be made is not one that favors the Young’s intentions, but 
instead focuses on the final outcome of her radicalised journey as a whole.  The 
moral acceptance of atrocities, identical to Young’s expressed joy towards the 
shooting of five members of the military in Chattanooga, Tennessee, by an 
Islamic militant, and her cited video of a man accused of being gay being thrown 
off a roof to his death by militants, certainly classifies her as RE (Fox News, 
2016).  However, her failed attempt to follow-through with her departure to 
Turkey, due to the successful online-surveillance and physical apprehension 
conducted by the FBI, eliminates all possibilities of categorising her as RVE.  
To be clear, albeit the lack of opportunity for Young to board her flight is 
accredited to surveillance tactics enforced by the FBI, had she boarded the flight 
to Turkey, followed by a second flight to Syria, she would have unquestionably 
been categorised as RVE; for her and Dakhalla would have been physically 
engaged militants situated in a combat support role. 
Jaelyn Young was initially attracted to physically engaged extremism 
by virtue of her strong emotional pull to act in the face of injustice and her 
internal honor, conflated with her misinterpretation of Islam.  Though unlikely, 
during and, or, subsequently after her incarceration, Young could theoretically 
maintain her RE mindset. Though, attempting to transition from RE to RVE 






Environmental Qualities of Online vs Offline 
Radicalisation & Recruitment, and its Relation to U.S. 
Policy 
 
 In this chapter, what is to be discussed is the differentiating factors 
between online and offline radicalisation and recruitment conducted by terrorist 
organisations, with a focus surrounding the United States of America (U.S.).  
Contrary to what some may perceive, in terms of terrorism, the process of online 
radicalisation and recruitment drastically differs from methods of its offline 
subordinate.  According to the Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) 
of the U.S. Justice Department, “Online radicalization to violence is the process 
by which an individual is introduced to an ideological message and belief 
system that encourages movement from mainstream beliefs toward extreme 
views, primarily through the use of online media, including social networks 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube” (2014).  This chapter in particular 
will expound upon the latter, in addition to incorporating and critically 
analysing existing U.S. legislation and policies meant to countervail this 
homegrown terrorism phenomenon.  More importantly, this installment will 
concurrently attempt to deduce policies and improve upon their strategic 
transparency.  Finally, chapter three will conclude with a final discussion and 
summary of the topics that have been covered throughout the section.  
Since its emergence in the 1990’s, the World Wide Web has provided 
many opportunities to advance globalisation as well as the interconnectedness 
between people.  Such revolutionary developments that are normally praised for 
their innovative attributes, are now viewed – at least in the security sector - as 
potential radicalisation and recruitment incubators which may produce 
unforeseeable circumstances of extremism and violence.  Similarly, in terms of 
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radicalising and recruiting individuals to assist in and, or, commit heinous acts 
of violence, the internet – more specifically the social media platforms that 
reside in it – is cause for concern in the efforts to combat this now widespread 
phenomenon.   
 What was once a regional phenomenon, most prevalent in territories 
housing existing terrorist networks, has now transcended into random acts of 
homegrown violence spilling over into the United States (U.S.).  Although this 
discussion is focused around self-radicalisation (a phenomenon in which an 
individual(s) may  progress  towards committing a terrorist act or not necessarily 
disagree with the intentions of such an act, with or without affiliating oneself 
with a radical group, although may be influenced by its ideology and message) 
and homegrown terrorism (acts of violence against civilian and/or military 
targets primarily in Western countries in which those committing violence have 
been born and raised) within the United States, it is important to note that such 
events could possibly take place in any other existing country, and, in some 
cases, has already – in reference to the murder of Lee Rigby, which took place 
in Woolwich, southeast London, back in 2013.   
3.1 Differences between Conventional and Online Radicalisation  
When discussing the causes of radicalisation, the intentional and systematic 
art of recruitment often times coexists within the majority of discourse taking 
place; thus, preventing a deeper perception of the terms otherwise found when 
discussed independently and separate from one another.  Although it is clear 
that the topic of recruitment shares a unique place in the radicalisation into 
violent extremism (RVE) discussion, it would be prudent to note that not all 
individuals who are in fact radicalised fall under the process of being recruited.  
Illustrating this and in reference to ‘Understanding Terror Networks’, Marc 
Sageman goes as far as to say, “There is no recruitment per se to armed jihad or 
Al- Quida” (2011).  Sageman continues to argue that contrarily to recruitment, 
enlistment is the mechanism for the emergence of new recruits; subsequently 
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depicting friendship to be the catalyst for about 70 percent of armed Jihad, 
kinship for about 20 percent, while discipleship comprises the remaining 10 
percent (2011).  Although one may argue that enlistment is most prevalent in 
regions that possess various terrorist networks, such as: Iraq, Syria, and 
Afghanistan, a similar argument could be made surrounding implemented 
methods of transnational radicalisation and recruitment regarding the nature of 
its exclusiveness conducted via online platforms (videos, images, and articles, 
containing violent material and, or, radical ideology).   
Unlike the primitive, more conventional methods of radicalisation and 
recruitment, or enlistment, – previously touched on by Sageman – the Internet 
provides various avenues for terrorists to display and advance their agendas in 
order to communicate their ideologies on a massive, unfiltered scale.  According 
to the Homeland Security Project’s proposal, Countering Online Radicalization 
in America, “terrorists have embraced the technology’s communicative aspects, 
helping them to spread their message and create (virtual) constituencies, and 
that such (virtual) communities are the places in which extremist behaviors are 
learned and normalized, enabling mobilization into violence to become 
possible” (2012, p. 15).  In many respects, as Neo suggests, these online 
communities form what is referred to as an ‘echo chamber’ which reinforces the 
commonly shared ideology of like-minded individuals (2016, p. 210).  
Similarly, Janbek and Steinfatt write, “terrorist organisations that maintain an 
online presence use the Internet today to communicate or to inform, to radicalise 
and to recruit, to educate and to plan, and to fundraise” (2016, p. 30).  To 
emphasise this, Bates and Mooney observe terrorist organisations’ online efforts 
to online education: “Al – Qaeda and other jihadist organisations are offering 
their own form of distance learning” (2014, para. 22)…  “These online training 
facilities are mostly offered for free and are accessible through semi- 
centralised, password-protected forums” (2014, para. 24).  Moreover, the 
Internet provides terrorists with a centralised form of useful information, 
including instructions for bomb assembly, poisoning, weapons construction, 
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and mixing lethal chemicals (Martin, 2006, p. 542).  Furthermore, research 
shows that today, an estimated 42 percent of the world is connected to the 
Internet (Internet World Stats, 2014).  In addition to the 42 percent of Internet 
users that exist globally, research shows that 84 percent of American adults 
possess Internet competency (Pew Research Center, 2015). Therefore, with 
globalisation on a steady incline, in conjunction with Internet usage and the 
dilating progression of technically competent individuals, the likelihood of such 
repugnant online content receiving recognition by curious individuals and 
potential radicals is much greater now than it was in recent years.   
Alternatively to the boundless communicative features of the Internet, 
Janbek and Williams instead argue that, although one cannot isolate the Internet 
as the main or only factor that causes individuals to commit an act of terrorism, 
through documented cases, one can confirm that the Internet has been used in 
various ways to facilitate different aspects of terrorism (2014, p. 302).  
Accordingly, Benson insists that, “merely establishing that the Internet played 
a role does not preclude the possibility the terrorists were first motivated offline 
to attack and only later used the Internet as one tool among many to attempt to 
carry out that attack” (2014, p. 311).  In contrast to Benson, Duarte concedes 
that online social interaction is considered to be potentially more compelling 
and persuasive than passively receiving information, due to communication 
through an isolated environment of like-minded individuals (2007, p. 173).  
What can be concluded is that it is imperative to understand that the 
radicalisation process and radicalism in general is not, and therefore has never 
been, generated by online platforms.  Rather, the access to the Internet and 
various online platforms has unquestionably enhanced the transmission of 
radical ideologies and extremist behaviors transnationally; thus inciting 
negative sentiment toward enemies, or self-proclaimed enemies, in addition to 




3.2 The Complex Challenges of the Digital Era 
When discussing the universal complexities encountered online, the most 
arguably controversial components associated with the cyber domain, 
synonymous to terrorist propaganda and extremist ideologies, are the various 
forms of communicative provisions (social media, chat rooms, video uplinks 
etc.) as well as the ambiguous civil liberties of the individual(s) operating within 
them.  To what some may conceive as cyber governance, or generally what I 
like to refer to as transferable law – when existing national laws are equated the 
same within each operational domain (cyber, land, air, space and sea) – is 
entirely fictional.  For example, in order for cyber governance to exist, there 
needs to be some sort of governing entity to enforce its regulations.  However, 
as there is presently no single entity to enforce cyber governance, nor is there a 
current multinational approach among states to enforce a sense of online 
orderliness, the outcome results in none other than cyber lawlessness. 
Furthermore, as each state possesses differing laws and statutes to accommodate 
its citisens, the inconsistent geographical borders of cyberspace creates 
implications as well as uncertainty throughout the discussion of applicable 
legislation, in turn, making it difficult to impose any form of law.  
As Peter Neumann from the National Security Project observes, the rise of 
the Internet in addition to the massive expansion of data storage over the past 
two decades has significantly overwhelmed and reduced the ability of policy 
makers to formulate rules for what law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
can and cannot do in terms of surveillance (2012, p. 39). This statement suggests 
that the reason in which government agencies are often unsure to what extent 
they can interact with open source information on the Internet, is because of 
undefined and unspecified guidelines.  Moreover, as mentioned previously, 
cyberspace is as borderless as it is utterly lawless.  As Neumann emphasises, 
“from surveillance to engagement, U.S. government rules for counter-terrorism 
and counter-radicalization distinguish between domestic and foreign. The 
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transnational nature of the Internet, however, makes such distinctions difficult: 
A website may be registered in one country, its content hosted in a second, the 
producer based in a third, and the user in a fourth” (2012, p. 40).  In addition to 
violent extremist online platforms being geographically disarranged, altering 
the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) associated with said platforms – as most 
of these platforms are notorious for doing - promotes further challenges towards 
the successful removal of turbulent content.  Despite how intricate the Internet 
is, it comes with no surprise that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS seem 
to capitalise on its current uncivilised state.   
In accordance with the difficulties surrounding violent extremist messages 
circling the Internet, Neo and Dillon state, “successful disruptions of prominent 
violent extremist online platforms can be quite useful in signaling the types of 
content that the country regards as offensive or harmful… Restricting the access 
to some of these attractive violent extremist online platforms presents the 
opportunity to prevent Internet users from chancing upon these online 
platforms.” (2016, p.11).  Contrarily however, Peter Neumann disagrees; 
arguing that censorship over the Internet is rarely effective, except in the most 
repressive countries, which restrict and supervise Internet access and devote 
massive resources to policing its general use (2012, p. 24).  In the United States, 
constitutional, political, and practical constraints make censorship impossible, 
given that constitutional free speech protections in the United States are as 
extensive as they are explicit (Neumann, 2012).   
Although censorship is currently not an option of interest, others seem to 
focus on much more practical methods pertaining to content oversight online, 
such as surveillance.  Schneier acknowledges that, in recent years, the U.S. 
National Security Agency (NSA) has incorporated “back door” programming 
in order to deconstruct encryption services (2007, N.p).  With uncertainty 
attributed to the encrypted traffic the NSA is or is not able to access, the notion 
that governments are able to analyse encrypted information suggests 
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inducement of apprehensiveness towards some individuals using services such 
as virtual private networks (VPN) when using the Internet (Torres-Soriano, 
2012).  Thus, as Kebball & Romyn state, “while the Internet can give the 
perception of anonymity to those who use it, it is still possible for law 
enforcement to race where information has come from and where it has gone” 
(2016, p. 92).  Needless to say, however, the vast majority of the content that 
qualifies as ‘extreme’ or ‘radically driven’ would be protected under the First 
Amendment (freedom of speech) of the United States Constitution (Neumann, 
2012).  Unless of course a statement contains a direct and credible threat against 
an identifiable individual, organization or institution, in addition to fulfilling 
legal test for harassment; or constitutes incitement to imminent lawless action 
(Anti-Defamation League, 2000, p. 3).  As a result, one can gather that 
exploiting the Internet by virtue of intelligence collection and/or evidence 
retrieval is the most effective way of dealing with online radicalization in the 
short term.  Therefore, the government should pursue this approach more 
systematically. 
3.3 Obstructive Characteristics of the Internet & Cyberspace 
 In many cases it has been argued that the Internet, operating through the 
medium of cyberspace (the total landscape of technology-mediated 
communication), provides mechanisms (social media platforms and online 
services) by which individuals, who would otherwise not have conducted a 
terrorist attack, can self-radicalise and access the information they require to 
carry out such attacks (Kebbell & Romyn, 2016, p. 92).  “Using a combination 
of traditional websites; mainstream social media platforms like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube; and other online services, extremists broadcast their 
views, provoke negative sentiment toward enemies, incite people to violence, 
glorify martyrs, create virtual communities with like-minded individuals, 
provide religious or legal justifications for proposed actions, and communicate 
with and groom new recruits” (COPS, 2014).  When incorporating these 
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mechanisms into the discussion encompassing the variance of online versus 
offline radicalisation, the results are apparent.  In contrast to terrorist networks 
- such as the Islamic State (IS) and al Qaeda - radicalising and recruiting 
individuals in the physical sense, the internet has the ability to shroud 
methodological steps taken in order for militants to connect with, communicate 
with, and muster, prospect radicals. Interestingly enough, individuals 
progressing through this online path towards radicalisation are most likely to be 
identified when they begin to speak out in favor of a terrorist group, religiously 
convert, and, or, publically support the brutality behind violent extremist acts. 
As it stands, law enforcement and domestic intelligence services do possess 
capabilities needed to trace where information has come from as well as where 
it has gone.  Despite this, however, the internet can grant the perception of 
anonymity to those that operate inside its domain via the services in which it 
provides; such as, virtual private networks (VPN) and onion routers (TOR).   
In theory, securitising online anonymity tools would essentially provide 
law enforcement and intelligence services with enhanced capabilities, thus 
reducing the overall discreetness found between extremists and their uploaded 
content in addition to the individuals they seek to influence and inspire.  The 
anticipated outcome of establishing this level of security welcomes a number of 
positive results.  Firstly, identifying and conducting online reconnaissance on 
suspected targets and, or, material would create a certain level of paranoia and 
apprehensiveness within the community of extremists and distributors of online 
propaganda.  Lastly, accessing specific extremist-related information online 
would allow law enforcement to systematically identify those planning an 
attack, those attempting to galvanise others to commit acts of violence, and, or 
individuals who are excessively curious towards radical content (Torres-
Soriano, 2012).  Considering the material maintained on these sites is designed 
to radically motivate others as well as facilitate a terrorist attack, “the 
monitoring of IP addresses of people who access these sites could assist in 
identifying those who are planning an attack” (Kebbell & Romyn, 2016, p. 97).  
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Therefore, by securing online anonymity, the evasiveness of uploading volatile 
material without being discovered lessens while the chances of disrupting 
terrorist plots and radicalisation pathways improve. 
Not excluding terrorism, usage of VPN in particular has been involved 
in many cases related to piracy, and, according to Kebball, “is a reasonably 
robust method to ensure online anonymity” (Kebball & Romyn, 2016, p. 92).  
Moreover, all traffic sent between a user and a VPN is encrypted, allowing the 
content of this traffic to remain hidden from the Internet service provider (ISP) 
or any other agency that may be collecting metadata (Larsson, 2012, p. 264).  
Furthermore, in terms of singling out and identifying which individuals have 
accessed particular information online, all compiled information as a result of 
investigation will refer to the VPN itself, rather than the person who was using 
that VPN (Kebball & Romyn, 2016, p. 92).   
Much like a VPN, an onion router, or ‘TOR’, is another commonly used 
method of maintaining online anonymity.  TOR is a method of online browsing 
that systematically randomizes a user’s internet traffic through multiple points, 
or ‘nodes’, before it reaches its online destination (Antoniades, 2010, p. 134).  
Although it has been suggested that moving large quantities of data through 
TOR is less sufficient than if one were to use a VPN, however, one of the 
numerous advantages of TOR is that it’s free, it is easy to install, and requires 
minimal information technology (IT) competency.  Similarly, unlike a VPN, 
TOR bypasses the use of a single service provider, allowing the user to remain 
elusive in the attempt to facilitate avoidance of scrutiny directed towards 
Internet traffic; which, in turn, would prevent the retrieval and dissemination of 
information from reaching the hands of domestic authorities (Kebbell & 
Romyn, 2016, p. 93).  Thus, the assertion pertaining to the ability to monitor 
and trace malicious internet traffic throughout the vastness of cyberspace could 
result in the user (in this case, the terrorist or potential radicalised individual) 
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avoiding detection and sequestering their identity, as well as their intentions, 
from law enforcement officials.  
Alternatively, as the Internet in many ways does provide some form of 
cyber camouflage to the individual looking to abusively take advantage of its 
function, it also promotes opportunities for authorities to systematically stalk 
and identify potential criminals, terrorists, potential online radicals, and, or, 
recruits.  As for VPN, although the ISP may be unable to identify the individual 
utilising their service, it is possible in some jurisdictions of government to 
require a locally – based ISP to block customers’ access to a VPN, if found that 
the service itself is facilitating terrorism related activities (Edman & Yener, 
2009, p. 20).  Per Kebball, “another possible solution, where user access to the 
VPN itself cannot be controlled, is for governments to block the actual VPN 
service from being able to access key services.  In that instance, while users 
would still be able to access the VPN, any traffic identified as being from that 
VPN would be blocked from accessing those services” (Kebball & Romyn, 
2016, p. 93).  In comparison to counter measures taken to repel suspicious usage 
of VPN, similar procedural steps are taken by authorities to appropriate the same 
preventive response one would find in TOR. 
In contrast to the steps taken to monitor and eliminate pernicious VPN 
usage, the process to observe comparable data within TOR is quite different.  
According to Murdoch and Danezis, “note that while it is impossible to observe 
traffic and identify a particular source, it is possible to identify which traffic has 
come from the same source and attempts to use the content of that traffic to 
identify the source itself” (2005, N.p).  Through observational methods, the 
essential objective in regards to online traffic monitoring authorises the 
investigator to construct a profile of a particular user, and sift through the 
content of their traffic for identifying information (Kebball &Romyn, 2016, p. 
95).  As stated earlier, although IT competency is not a critical component when 
operating TOR, maintaining an online presence without revealing identifying 
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information can be exceedingly difficult.  Numerous domestic law enforcement 
agencies and organisations have taken note of this weakness and have begun to 
capitalise on it.   
“As online traffic passes through TOR, it must exit TOR through what 
is known as an exit node, which is a random router that can be set up by anyone 
who wishes to be a part of TOR” (Kebball & Romyn, 2016, p. 96).  It has been 
determined that by controlling the exit node(s) of TOR, government agencies 
that specialise in cyber security are now able to insert malicious code into the 
original user’s traffic in order to identify the origin from which it came (Kebball 
& Romyn, 2016, p. 93).  Albeit the identity of individuals using TOR is hidden 
from investigative onlookers, the identity of the exit node that the traffic is 
originating from can be determined.  One method in particular that grants 
admittance to the necessary precision government agencies need in order to 
identify, overload, and shut down these specific exit nodes, is known as ‘sniper 
attack’ (Jansen, 2014, N.p).   A sniper attack has been described as a tactic which 
can be used to exploit exit nodes and identify individuals using TOR, thusly, 
proceeding to force the individual’s traffic to re-route through a disparate exit 
node (Jansen, 2014, N.p).  With respect to Kebball & Romyn, “by overloading 
the exit node that has been monitored by the government that the individual is 
using, the user’s traffic can eventually be routed through an exit node that is 
being monitored by the government agency.  At this point, the original user can 
be identified” (2016, p. 94).   
Apart from VPN and TOR, there are many other online tools accessible 
for jihadists to take advantage of in order to mask their intentions and strengthen 
their cause within and throughout the cyber domain.  The process of avoiding 
detection in a physical environment in comparison to its online subordinate, 
however, is seamlessly straight forward. Online platforms aside, extremists 
affiliated with terrorist networks cannot avoid detection by hiding behind some 
disfigured emoji, avatar, VPN, and, or, TOR.  Instead, terrorist networks that 
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are IT incompetent operating abroad and offline, or, interestingly enough, do 
not take advantage of the Internet conducive to other, more notorious terrorist 
organisations – such as the Islamic State - must instead avoid: physical 
disruption of terrorist networks, constant surveillance from unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV), espionage, and even death.  Moreover, the art of which 
radicalising young men and women in countries that inherently breed terrorist 
networks, such as: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Afghanistan – to name a few - are 
detached from the West by miles of land and sea.  Despite the Middle East being 
isolated from the West, one of the main reasons why online radicalisation and 
recruitment is so prevalent within the U.S., is due to the influential extension 
the Internet provides in addition to the controversial narrative currently 
surrounding Islam and the establishment of IS.   
Cyberspace, inconsistent with geography, is essentially borderless.  The 
network and interconnected information systems that occupy its vastness, reside 
simultaneously in both physical and virtual space, and within and outside of 
geographical borders (Kuehl, N.d, p. 3).  As important as interconnectivity is, a 
consequence of its global adherence has led to the inter-transmittance of social 
and regional phenomenon’s.  This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, however, with 
and increase in homegrown radicalisation due to online propaganda and 
extremist ideals weighing in on the U.S. and its citisens, it would hardly be 
surprising if one were to find themselves debating the pros and cons to which 
the Internet and cyberspace produce.  Over the course of time, IS has gained 
superiority, or dominance rather, in cyberspace.  They have exemplified their 
objective and have influenced mass amounts of individuals via online platforms, 
such as: Facebook, Twitter, and various online chat rooms.  A movement that 
would have only been reported on because of the sinister theme it upholds, has 
now infiltrated and affected the United States in a way that is unfamiliar to its 
domestic authorities as well as its elected officials. 
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What would have otherwise remained in its conceived location has now 
influenced and dispersed into neighboring states. Without the contemporary use 
of online platforms, IS, in regards to the influence it has been able to maintain 
for an extended period of time, may have shortly dissolved due to insufficient 
demographic support and gain within and outside its region(s) of operation, or 
would have exhausted all of its resources as a result of inadequate material 
goods.  Instead, as a consequence of global interconnectivity via cyberspace, in 
addition to deficiencies surrounding U.S. policies installed for sake of weeding 
out malevolent behavior online, IS has been provided an outlet which enables 
them to popularise and bolster their purpose within the U.S., in absence of its 
physical presence. Accordingly, much of IS’ success, in relation to appealing to 
and galvanising certain individuals, can be credited towards efforts of 
establishing false ‘anti-Muslim’ or ‘Islamophobic’ sentiment aimed towards 
Western states by means of online platforms they continuously take advantage 
of.  Similarly, what has been unintentionally overlooked and, to some extent 
ignored, is pragmatic congnition - how changing the mindset of someone else 
can still be considered an attack.  Cyberspace is a key operational medium by 
which “strategic influence” is conducted, and references to “Jihad.com” have 
become ever more inflated (Kuehl, N.d).  The U.S government, as well as 
existing terrorist networks – such as IS and Al’ Qaida – are both using cyber 
power as a crucial capability in the struggle for minds and ideas.  “Recent 
studies indicate that 90 percent of terrorist activity on the Internet takes place 
using some type of social networking tool” (Weimann, 2012).  Unfortunately 
for the U.S., by means of cellular encryption, neglecting to amend current 
legislation, as well as online persuasion and propaganda, the modern cyber 
extremist is ahead in this exchange. 
One would assume that given all of the technological methods 
authorities have at their disposal, terrorist organisations, as well as the 
individuals influenced by them, would be more apprehensive to conduct to what 
some could argue is a public predilection of ones intentions and agenda.  Whilst 
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some argue it would be disadvantageous for terrorists to conduct operations via 
the Internet due to the likelihood of being monitored and identified, the 
possibility of the extremist(s) involved being able to effectively conceal his or 
her identity and further impede identification and reconnaissance procedures 
conducted by law enforcement, is an unfortunate certainty.  One could argue 
that this is a consequence of the cyber domain in and of itself, as it is vast and 
to some degree intangible; or the result of unenhanced and, or, limited 
legislation currently existing within the United States.  Let us now observe some 
of the policies and strategies the U.S. adheres to. 
3.4 U.S. Regulations, Policies & Strategies  
Passed on October 25th, 2001, the United States Patriot Act was 
essentially designed to amplify the power and jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) as well as other domestic intelligence collectors, 
generating enhancements to their ability to monitor and collect intelligence on 
suspected terrorists.  However, due to its primary function of universal scrutiny 
directed towards suspected international terrorism, counterespionage, or foreign 
intelligence investigations; the document raises further concerns about civil 
liberties and human rights violations (Holm, 2004, p. xxvii).  Lacking required 
Congressional approval, sections of the Patriot Act expired on June 1st, 2015.  
With the passage of the USA Freedom Act on June 2nd, 2015 – a document that 
aided restoration of several parts of the Patriot Act which had expired on the 
previous day - the expired sections were restored and renewed through 2019.  
Despite the documents reestablishment, Section 215 of the law was 
subsequently amended in order to stop the National Security Agency (NSA) 
from continuing its mass phone data collection program (Kelly, 2015, N.p).  
Instead, it has been implied that phone companies will retain the data and in 
order for the NSA to obtain desired information pertaining to targeted 
individuals, they must first request permission from a federal court (Kelly, 2015, 
N.p).  The obstruction of intelligence collection techniques for purposes of 
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installing a second party intermediary – the federal court - is a decelerating step 
on ladder that must uphold an efficient level of alacrity. 
As stated in Title II: Enhanced Surveillance Procedures, in Section 215 
of the Patriot Act, coinciding with highly controversial provisions initiated by 
human rights and civil liberties groups, is a regulation that allows the FBI to 
make an order "requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect 
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided 
that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon 
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution."  
Similarly, the scope and availability of wiretapping and surveillance orders were 
expanded under Title II.  The Act allowed any district court judge in the United 
States to issue such surveillance orders and search warrants for terrorism 
investigations.  In congruence with Title III of the Stored Communications 
Access Act, search warrants were also expanded.  Such steps now allow the FBI 
to gain access to stored voicemail’s by means of search warrant, rather than 
through the more stringent wiretap law. 
The issue surrounding the success of current and future counter-
terrorism operations is not necessarily a question of how much information has 
been obtained; but instead, what methods, policies, and strategies are readily 
accessible in order for law enforcement of every caliber to efficiently facilitate 
evidence procurement, in addition to successfully counter homegrown 
radicalisation.  Due to its intricacy, this extremist phenomenon is far too 
overwhelming for law enforcement to combat on their own without infringing 
on lawful Internet use, as well as the privacy and civil liberties of individual 
users.  Technology and how it is applied is becoming just as increasingly 
affluent as it is adaptive.  Current U.S. legislature, however, seems reluctant to 
follow this revolutionary trend and, as a result, has been exposed to certain 
vulnerabilities in the technology realm that hinder its application.   
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According to Peter Neumann, report author for the Homeland Security 
Project (HSP), “In its 2011 counter-radicalisation strategy and the subsequent 
implementation plan, the White House acknowledged that ‘the Internet has 
become an increasingly potent element in radicalisation to violence’ and 
promised to ‘develop a separate, more comprehensive strategy for countering 
and preventing violent extremist online radicalisation and leveraging 
technology to empower community resilience’. One year later – referring to 
2012, this still hasn’t happened, and this report’s first and most important 
recommendation is for the White House to complete its work on the strategy, 
make it public, and begin its implementation with alacrity” (p. 45).  In 
compliance with Neumann and his ongoing project, the quintessential tools and 
resources needed in order to facilitate progress in all the necessary areas of 
policy, do in fact exist.  However, a formal American domestic counter-
radicalisation strategy has yet to be produced.  U.S. strategies aside, de-
radicalisation programs have started to surface all over the world, some of 
which having been initiated in Muslim majority counties, in hopes of reducing 
this socially inhibiting phenomenon.  For instance, nations, such as: Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 
have witnessed the development of its own particular approach to promoting 
disengagement of some form of terrorism (Horgan, 2008, N.p).  Consequently, 
these countries seem less interested in facilitating de-radicalisation and more 
interested in attempting to promote disengagement and desistance from terrorist 
activity in the limited sense.  Therefore the radical ideology an individual 
maintained throughout their service in a terrorist organisation may still remain 
even if and when he/she is detached from terrorism.  Nevertheless, multiple 
strategies within these programs have also been developed involving the process 
of de-radicalisation.  For instance, the ‘Child Combatant program’, part of the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice's Reincorporation Programme in Colombia, 
goes as far as attempting to reduce the size of terrorist movements by requiring 
incarcerated perpetrators to demonstrate symptoms of behavioral shifts 
63 
 
(Horgan, 2008, N.p).  In other words, adolescents admitted into the program on 
the basis of the ideology they retain, may not be out-processed until there is a 
noticeable change in moral outlook. 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has solidified 
itself as the lead entity in countering terrorism worldwide and, with its 
proclaimed status, has employed a variety of tools—military oriented and 
diplomatic—to pursue this objective adamantly.  Despite its undertaking, 
Washington has been exceedingly apprehensive towards devising a solid 
cohesive strategy to counter radicalisation.  Negligence has resulted in 
Washington’s inability to accommodate the atrocious characteristics of 
radicalisation, particularly taking place within the cyber domain.  Contrary to 
several European countries, which have invested substantial human, financial, 
and political capital in extensive, long-term, centrally-crafted counter-
radicalisation strategies with multi-agency implementation, the United States 
possesses disorganised initiatives that fail to amass into a well-designed plan 
(Vidino, 2010, p. 2).  For example, in comparison to CONTEST, the United 
Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy, the American equivalent seems to be 
undiscovered.  Inverse to the latter and contrary to Neumann, the United States 
does possess somewhat of a counter-radicalisation strategy.  This strategy, 
however, lacks proactive components, such as the preemptive efforts observed 
in Colombia’s ‘Child Combatant Program’, in addition to hardly extending 
beyond the art of research and engagement.   
In August 2011, the White House issued a paper entitled ‘Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States’, which 
outlined the country’s plan to counter radicalisation. The August document was 
followed in December 2011 by the release of another document entitled 
‘Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States’, which expanded on the previous 
document’s provisions (Neumann, 2012, p. 4).  The August 2011 strategy, as 
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Neumann points out, “acknowledged “the important role the Internet and social 
networking sites play in advancing violent extremist narratives”” (2012, p. 4).  
Furthermore, in Washington’s Implementation Plan, released December 2011, 
it was stated that “the Internet has become an increasingly potent element in 
radicalization to violence” and that new “programs and initiatives” had to be 
“mindful of the online nature of the threat” (White House’s Counter-
radicalization Strategy, 2011, p. 20).  Interestingly enough, however, the two 
documents - if compared to strategies that have been long implemented in 
Europe - outline initiatives that are not nearly as aggressive as they should be 
(Vidino, N.d, p. 2).  Moreover, the White House acknowledging that “the 
Internet has become an increasingly potent element in radicalization to 
violence,” has made imperceptible strides.  Furthermore, six years later, the 
White House has fallen short of their promise to “develop a separate, more 
comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent extremist online 
radicalization and leveraging technology to empower community resilience.” 
Instead, current U.S. ‘strategies’ are mostly limited to constructing an extensive 
knowledge base for understanding characteristics related to the radicalisation 
process and engaging the American Muslim community.  Doubtless, these two 
aspects are unquestionably important, and certainly all European counter-
radicalisation strategies similarly adopt them as integral components comprised 
into a larger agenda (Vidino, N.d, p. 2). However, as Vidino perspicuously 
points out, “the American strategy stops short of outlining the many and more 
proactive and ambitious measures that characterize the European approach to 
counter-radicalization beyond research and engagement” (N.d, p. 2).  An ideal 
U.S. strategy would advocate an increase in communication and cooperation 
between public and private partnerships (PPP’s), in addition to encouraging 
private corporations – like Facebook, Apple and Twitter - to establish privately 
funded counter-terrorism units.  Sufficient PPP’s are critical in efforts to 
successfully combat online-radicalisation and terrorism.  
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Although the U.S. Government, particularly the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) - which in 2007 was designated by Congress as the 
lead department to counter radicalisation - espouses awareness through Internet 
safety initiatives, educating the profuse amount of institutions in place (school 
districts, Parent Teacher Associations, local government, etc.) isn’t, on its own, 
going to successfully ward off future terrorist attacks.  Rather, in addition to 
these informative seminars, DHS must also devise and further expand upon 
preexisting pilot programs, similar to the three current programs that stand in 
several U.S. states (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 1).  The Boston Marathon 
bombing, followed by the rise of IS, triggered a renewed focus on Counter 
Violent Extremism (CVE) (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 1). As a result, “a part 
of the revamped effort includes pilot programs in three cities, each with a 
distinct approach: Minneapolis-St. Paul’s focused on societal-level concerns, 
Los Angeles’ on community engagement, and Boston’s on interventions with 
radicalized individuals” (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 1). 
 As stated by Vidino, “The United States has lagged behind many 
European countries in creating a comprehensive CVE approach, largely because 
its homegrown violent extremist threat is relatively low. Only in 2011 did the 
U.S. launch a formal CVE strategy and its implementation has been disjointed 
and underfunded.  Moreover, successful implementation of CVE initiatives 
faced key challenges during the Obama administration.  These challenges 
consisted of: lack of funding and resources devoted to CVE; lack of a lead 
agency appointed to appropriately manage CVE efforts at the national and local 
levels; and, lastly, resistance from Muslim communities (Vidino & Hughes, 
2015, p. 1).  In order for any constructive progress to develop, these challenges 
must be attended to and overthrown, promptly.  Furthermore, the amount of 
funding invested in community engagement should, in one’s own opinion, be 
deferred and redirected elsewhere.  Instead, corresponding with Europe’s 
posture, individual interventions are not only easier to evaluate – as the focus 
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has been tightened, they also produce a cost-effective solution that would 
replace large, more expensive, programs. 
What is certainly present within the U.S., is tactics failing to emulate 
proper strategy.  Furthermore, there is great obscurity surrounding how the U.S. 
should proceed with approaching these issues.  More so, by virtue of former 
President Barack Obama transferring power over to his successor, President 
Donald Trump, and his administration.  Although tending to this national 
security matter is most pressing and imperative, how one administration chose 
to manage risk does not necessarily transfer over to the succeeding 
administration – especially when the current administration is represented by 
the opposing political party of the former. 
State action is an important form of strategic communication and 
therefore significant to CVE initiatives on and offline.  Contradicting its 
altruistic purpose, however, are non-state actors who are, more often than not, 
eager to use state action (and sometimes inaction) to incite and legitimise 
violence against the state and its citizens (Cheong, 2016, p. 283).  In comparison 
to this, counter-radicalisation programs are an immensely complex and 
controversial subject which, in one’s own opinion, requires gradual application 
(Vidino, 2010, p. 10). Such programs touch on – what some may consider - 
extremely sensitive issues, such as religion, identity, and integration (Vidino, 
2010, p. 10).   According to Lorenzo Vidino, “they can be highly intrusive, 
impinge on civil liberties, and risk further alienating the very group they seek 
to reach” (2010, p. 10).  Nevertheless, the ubiquitous use of the Internet has 
made it possible for terrorist groups to remotely foment attacks with little risk 
of capture.  With that said, it is imperative for policymakers to indoctrinate 
innovative ways to prevent this radicalisation process from occurring - on and 
offline - in addition to implementing strategies designated to eliminate the 






Research Question: How can online self-radicalisation be successfully 
countered?   
For a long period of time, early efforts of attempting to understand 
radicalisation had been psychologically driven and primarily focused on 
research involving the individual(s) and his or her behavior.  Since the 1960’s, 
however, academic analysis pertaining to the phenomenon of radicalisation has 
now broadened and further includes observation into: group interaction, social 
networks, and affiliated organisations; thus disproving that radicalisation of an 
individual reflects mental and personal abnormalities.  As such, radicalisation 
foreshadowing acts of terrorism is no longer viewed as a “condition”, but is 
instead viewed as a dynamic process lacking a definitive terrorist personality.  
Moreover, definitions of “radical” “radicalism” and, or, “radicalisation” face 
conflation if not used in the proper context.  Therefore, it is crucial that one 
identify which context best suits their agenda and, or, interests.  In this paper 
two variations of the word “radicalism” were discussed: one absolute and one 
relative.  Although both provided invaluable insight into the phenomenon of 
radicalisation, it was decided that the focus should embrace the words relative 
definition, taken from the Oxford English Dictionary: “representing or 
supporting an extreme section of a party” (2009).  It is in this sense the word 
may be synonymous with the term “extremist”, thereby providing clarity and 
awareness to the reader (Sedgwick, 2012). 
Radicalisation in terms of violence, also referred to as radicalisation into 
violent extremism (RVE), could essentially be described as the processes by 
which people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it 
(Borum, 2011). However, the distinction that should be made when comparing 
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radical acts of violence to regular, non- radical, acts of violence, is the presence 
of ideology as a motive.  Although the process of engaging in terrorism or 
violent extremism has been argued to be the product of radicalisation and the 
development of extreme ideologies; radicalising by developing or adopting 
extremist beliefs that justify violence is just one of many possible pathways into 
terrorism involvement (Borum, 2011).  Furthermore, as research shows that 
there is not a single pathway to RVE, and that the process undergone by one 
individual may not be the same process undergone by another; it is apparent that 
a single theory or discipline will not encapsulate a definitive pathway.  In 
addition to the lack of clarity attributed to radicalisation, other areas related to 
the topic harbor similar contextual perplexities.  Accordingly, the term “radical” 
is carelessly used to satisfy the context in a number of differing agendas, such 
as: the security agenda, integration agenda, and foreign – policy agenda 
(Sedgwick, 2012).  The various existing contexts (security, integration, and 
foreign-policy) inadvertently convolute the word “radicalisation”, or what it 
means to be radical.  What tends to be problematic is not the word itself, but the 
suggested “absolute concept” of how the word is applied within the discourse 
of said contexts.  An example of this would be the parallel drawn between Islam 
and violence, as well as the observable prejudice towards how all Islamists are 
driven by religious principles. 
Similar to the lack of clarity surrounding “radicalism”, the term threat 
radicalism- extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be 
taken – follows suit (Hamm, 2008).  Overemphasising the violence associated 
with radicalisation, the definition of both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘threat radicalism’ 
ignore the majority of cases that do not lead directly to violence, or do not 
necessarily lead to violence at all.  Accordingly, the intentional and systematic 
principles of recruitment often times coexists within the majority of discourse 
pertaining to radicalisation.  However, although recruitment shares a unique 
place in RVE, enlistment is the dominant mechanism for the emergence of new 
recruits (Sedgwick, 2010).  
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There are many pathways through which radicalisation occurs, each of 
which is affected by a variety of factors. Within this "pathway" approach, it has 
been determined that radicalisation should not be perceived as the product of a 
single decision, but rather the end result of a dialectical process that, overtime, 
gradually pushes an individual toward violence (McCormick, 2003).  To 
illustrate this process and other processes , the following theories were reviewed 
in order for the reader to gain tautological understanding and comprehension of 
various frameworks that bare influence over terrorism: social movement theory, 
which focuses on the irrational processes of collective behavior occurring under 
strained environmental conditions; social psychology theory, which concerns 
itself with relationships, influences, and transactions among people, and 
particularly group behavior; and conversion theory, which devotes less focus on 
the collective movement, and more so on the individual process of transforming 
beliefs and ideologies. 
Apart from individuals being naturally integrated into their respected 
Western societies, ‘home grown’ terrorism in the Western part of the world has 
been on steady incline for the past decade and a half.  Home grown terrorism 
has been defined as: acts of violence against civilian and, or, military targets 
that are primarily orchestrated in Western countries – such as Europe and the 
U.S. - in which those committing violence have been born and raised.  Despite 
the existence of other forms of radicalisation, Islam seems to be the most 
concerning issue throughout Western society.  Similarly, Islamic ideologies are 
currently prominent and may consist of anti-western propaganda. Therefore, it 
is important to differentiate between both Islam - said to be a religion that does 
not promote violence, nor encourage hatred on none Muslims, and Islamism - a 
totalitarian political ideology driven by potent anti-western goals (Borum, 
2010).   
Although radicalisation in the U.S. is relatively new, the methods these 
radicalised individuals adopt in order to facilitate their migration is congruent 
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with the digital era (Saltman, 2016).  Moreover, online communications and 
Internet tools have reduced logistic complexities and provided an outlet for 
individuals seeking to coordinate and organise their own migration to join a 
conflict in order to gain acceptance into terrorist organisations, like IS (Saltman, 
2016).  These same tools are also applied to radicalise users by: indoctrinating 
individuals through deconstruction of previous ideology, providing the curious 
with quick and easily accessible educational resources, and acting as a social 
platform in order to further reinforce radical ideology and extremist propaganda.  
It is understood that the biggest advantages of these communications, is the 
sending of unfiltered messages received by the intended audience (Hussain & 
Saltman, 2014).  Unfortunately social media openly contributes to the 
mainstream recruitment platform for online radicals and extremists, thereby 
allowing many recruits to virtually connect with IS fighters located in Iraq and 
Syria. 
As previously mentioned, the pathway to radicalisation is a dynamic 
process.  However, within that process it was learned that one’s progression 
towards radicalisation can be divided into individual stages.  Likewise, an 
individual(s) progressing through these stages, leading up to radicalisation, 
inherently does so at varying timeframes (Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005).  
In order to comprehend the radicalsation process as well as the many avenues 
within it, we examined a diverse set of existing radicalisation models developed 
by a number of experts.  Through observation it had been discovered that the 
content and structure found within the discussed models differ greatly, due to: 
perceived variance in the radicalisation process, key aspects of radicalisation 
sought to be emphasised and exposed, in addition to differences of opinion 
among a number of scholars. Despite this, many of these models failed to 
accentuate the radicalisation process as it exists in the cyber element, rather than 
its conventional one. 
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Correspondingly, the reviewed models illustrate different outlooks on 
the radicalisation process.  For example, Borum’s four stage model was 
originally developed to provide beneficial insight of the radicalisation process 
to law enforcement officials.  Moreover, the model insists that grievances, in 
addition to exposure to radical discourse, generate hatred towards certain 
groups; ensuing a final outcome that allows the individual to embrace ideologies 
pertaining to jihad and martyrdom (Borum, 2011).  Although the model itself is 
overly simplistic and incompatible with online self-radicalisation - as it does not 
include interaction with the Internet or its platforms - the first and second phase 
of the model, grievance and injustice, provide a common foundation that is 
acknowledged in other existing models.  The second model that was examined 
was Moghaddams terrorism staircase model, which suggests that the path to 
terrorism is a set of progressive stages with fewer and fewer individuals 
progressing onto each stage within the staircase (Moghaddam, 2005).  
Dissimilar from most models, Moghaddam insists that the first stage an 
individual embarks on in the radicalisation process is a product of ‘personal 
adversity’.  Although the staircase structure of the model is efficiently laid out, 
the psychological connotation throughout the model was determined to be 
outdated if and when applied to contemporary processes of radicalisation.  
Helfstein’s four stage model, contrary to older models, views the phases of 
radicalisation as a dynamic series, similar to a cycle of events.  The model was 
created based on case studies of radicalised individuals and plots of terrorism in 
the U.S. and argues that radicalisation cannot be independently viewed as a 
social or ideological process, but instead suggests it is a “coevolutionary” 
process (Helfstein, 2012).  Dissimilar from other models, Helfstein’s model 
emphasises that Internet sites, YouTube and online magazines, convey radical 
ideology, further conceding that interaction with the online platforms seem to 
facilitate the institutional process of socialization (2012).  Lastly, Torok’s 
explanatory model utilising psychiatric power, examines power relationships 
online in addition to how discourses are formed and propagated online (Torok, 
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2016).  The model itself was formulated to focus on three critical foundations: 
outlooks on social media platforms regarded as online institutions seeking to 
isolate and expose individuals to one-dimensional discourse; normalisation of 
extremist discourse, conveyed with authority and truth; and, lastly, power is 
networked with individuals being radicalised by various sources consisting of 
homogenous extreme discourse, rather than a single entity (Torok, 2016, p.65).  
Although Torok’s model is the most contemporary model to date, it is unclear 
whether the model continues to follow the individuals’ induction into extremist 
thinking.  Furthermore, this model lacks transparency surrounding the social 
media environment and influential power, in addition to a visual interpretation 
of the models structure. 
In pursuance of improving and extending upon self-radicalisation and 
how it is regarded in its cyber element, the author proposed an alternative model. 
Angelini’s online self-radicalisation model (AOSRM) seeks to interpret online 
radicalisation as a process leading up to radicalisation into violent extremism 
(RVE), whilst simultaneously exposing the possibility of an individual not 
partaking in violent acts of any kind; thereby allowing the individual to branch 
off into what is referred to as radicalisation into extremism (RE).  AOSRM was 
created simply to provide transparency on the online self- radicalisation process.  
The phase model starts off with exogenous conditions, also referred to as 
‘triggering factors’.  These factors, whether they are motivations of any kind 
(economic frustration; political, social, and, or cultural injustices) are 
completely unique to the individual and may lead to curiousness and, or, self-
education on matters relatable to oneself.  Sequentially, echo-chamber 
indoctrination follows suit and provides insight into the individuals’ online 
consumption of radical discourse through isolated online communities.  This 
phase goes on to explain that disaffected individuals searching for an outlet to 
self-educate or socialise with people that possess similar or identical ideologies 
and, or, grievances actually turn out isolating themselves, in turn, reinforcing 
commonly held ideas that are safe from criticism.  Subsequently, conversion, 
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the third phase in AOSRM, introduces a conscious, or sometimes sub-
conscious, decision involving identification or association with what is to be 
believed as the message of Islam – also referred to as Islamism – and is the 
radical tipping point in the process.  Justification is essentially the last phase in 
the AOSRM model which ensues radicalisation.  Accordingly, it is the divisions 
within the phase of justification – RVE and RE - that distinguish it from other 
models.  The divisions establish a precedent that reveals how extremists do not 
always result to violence.  Nevertheless, individuals who have progressed to this 
stage of the model, though they may not end up committing or supporting acts 
of violence, may not necessarily disagree with them.   
Preceding the introduction of AOSRM, three cases involving online- 
radicalisation and terrorism were analysed.  Coupled with the unfortunate 
outcome when officials are deprived of quintessential resources, inclusive of 
confrontation with obstinate behavior and refusal of entry into private 
technologies produced by private corporations, the case study analysis 
essentially sought to unmask and emphasise the harsh reality of when civil 
liberties interfere with the future safety of the American people. In each case 
the author exploited the backgrounds, interests and incentives, of the 
perpetrator(s).  Criticism and admiration was impartially distributed towards the 
procedural steps taken, or not taken, in attempts to countervail online-
radicalisation and terrorism.  Moreover, the author’s recommendations are 
offered in hopes of improving a systemic problem found within the U.S.  
Furthermore, the first two cases – the San Bernardino Massacre and the Boston 
Beheading Plot - underwent analysis to the extent of highlighting the failure’s 
and success’ directed towards prevention and apprehension of a terrorist attack.  
The third and final case exemplified the success of a counter-terrorism 
operation, in addition to incorporating the author’s personalised online self-
radicalisation model - AOSRM.  Correspondingly, the first two cases that were 
selected generated distinct infractions and obedience regarding the institutions 
involved (FBI, Facebook, Apple, etc.), technologies and regulations confronted 
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– concerns that were critically addressed in chapter three.  The third case that 
was selected simply demonstrated a coherent pathway towards extremism by 
means of radical online material, and was therefore thoroughly analysed via 
compatibility with the author’s radicalisation model, AOSRM.  The overall 
application of the author’s model offered insight to the online self-radicalisation 
process; more specifically how it can facilitate preemptive awareness and, 
perhaps, intervention, in further support of successfully thwarting terrorism 
prior to its devastating aftermath. 
To conclude, the third and final chapter discussed the differentiating 
factors between online and offline radicalisation and recruitment conducted by 
terrorist organisations, with a focus surrounding the United States of America 
(U.S).  Moreover, a critical analysis was conducted on U.S policies and 
legislation installed for the purpose of countervailing homegrown terrorism.  
Since its emergence in the 1990’s, the World Wide Web has provided many 
opportunities to advance globalisation as well as the interconnectedness 
between people.  Such revolutionary developments that are normally praised for 
their innovative attributes, are now viewed – at least in the security sector - as 
potential radicalisation and recruitment incubators which may produce 
unforeseeable circumstances of extremism and violence.  As a consequence, 
what was once a regional phenomenon – radicalisation and recruitment - most 
prevalent in territories housing existing terrorist networks, has now transcended 
into random acts of homegrown violence spilling over into the United States 
(U.S.).    
It is clear that the topic of recruitment shares a unique place in the 
radicalisation into violent extremism (RVE) discussion, however, it is important 
to note that not all individuals who are in fact radicalised fall under the process 
of being recruited.  Alternatively, enlistment is the mechanism for the 
emergence of new recruits; subsequently depicting friendship to be the catalyst 
for about 70 percent of armed Jihad, kinship for about 20 percent, while 
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discipleship comprises the remaining 10 percent (Sageman, 2011). Unlike the 
primitive, more conventional methods of radicalisation and recruitment, or 
enlistment, the Internet provides various avenues for terrorists to display and 
advance their agendas in order to communicate their ideologies on a massive, 
unfiltered scale.  Access to the Internet and various online platforms has 
unquestionably enhanced the transmission of radical ideologies and extremist 
behaviors transnationally; thus inciting negative sentiment towards enemies, or 
self-proclaimed enemies, in addition to undertaking potential recruit 
mobilisation by means of online propaganda.  Moreover, the Internet provides 
terrorists with a centralised form of useful information, including instructions 
for bomb assembly, poisoning, weapons construction, and mixing lethal 
chemicals (Martin, 2006, p. 542).   
Considering there is presently no single entity to enforce cyber 
regulations, nor is there a current multinational approach among states to 
enforce a sense of online orderliness, the idea of cyber governance maintains its 
status as an unemployed perception.  In conjunction with each state possessing 
disparate laws and statutes to accommodate its citisens, the rise of the Internet 
in addition to the massive expansion of data storage over the past two decades 
has significantly overwhelmed and reduced the ability of policy makers to 
formulate rules for what law enforcement and intelligence agencies can and 
cannot do in terms of surveillance (Neumann, 2012, p. 39).  Although 
preferential censorship in some cases may be considered ideal, the United 
States’ constitutional, political, and practical constraints make censorship 
impossible, given that constitutional free speech protections in the U.S are as 
extensive as they are explicit (Neumann, 2012).   
It was formerly discussed that securitising online anonymity tools – such 
as VPN’s and TOR - would essentially provide law enforcement and 
intelligence services with enhanced capabilities, thereby reducing the overall 
discreetness found between extremists and their uploaded content in addition to 
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the individuals they seek to influence and inspire.  Moreover, all traffic sent 
between a user and a VPN is encrypted, allowing the content of this traffic to 
remain hidden from the Internet service provider (ISP) or any other agency that 
may be collecting metadata (Larsson, 2012, p. 264).  Comparable to VPN, an 
onion router, or ‘TOR’, is another commonly used method of maintaining online 
anonymity.  TOR is a method of online browsing that systematically randomizes 
a user’s internet traffic through multiple points, or ‘nodes’, before it reaches its 
online destination (Antoniades, 2010, p. 134).  Furthermore, TOR bypasses the 
use of a single service provider, allowing the user to remain elusive in the 
attempt to facilitate avoidance of scrutiny directed towards Internet traffic; 
which, in turn, would prevent the retrieval and dissemination of information 
from reaching the hands of domestic authorities (Kebbell & Romyn, 2016, p. 
93).  Despite the cyber camouflage provided by the Internet, its various 
functions also promote opportunities for authorities to systematically stalk and 
identify potential criminals, terrorists, potential online radicals, and, or, recruits.  
For example, As for VPN, although the ISP may be unable to identify the 
individual utilising their service, it is possible in some jurisdictions of 
government to require a locally – based ISP to block customers’ access to a 
VPN, if found that the service itself is facilitating terrorism related activities 
(Edman & Yener, 2009, p. 20).   
Cyberspace, inconsistent with geography, is essentially borderless.  The 
network and interconnected information systems that occupy its vastness, reside 
simultaneously in both physical and virtual space, and within and outside of 
geographical borders (Kuehl, N.d, p. 3).  As important as interconnectivity is, a 
consequence of its global adherence has led to the inter-transmittance of social 
and regional phenomenon’s.  What would have otherwise remained in its 
conceived location has now influenced and dispersed into neighboring states. 
Without the contemporary use of online platforms, IS, in regards to the 
influence it has been able to maintain for an extended period of time, may have 
shortly dissolved due to insufficient demographic support and gain within and 
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outside its region(s) of operation, or would have exhausted all of its resources 
as a result of inadequate material goods.  Accordingly, much of IS’ success, in 
relation to appealing to and galvanising certain individuals, can be credited 
towards efforts of establishing false ‘anti-Muslim’ or ‘Islamophobic’ sentiment 
aimed towards Western states by means of online platforms they continuously 
take advantage of.  Naturally, the Internet is the perfect environment to convey 
such a message; seeing as cyberspace is a key operational medium by which 
“strategic influence” is conducted (Kuehl, N.d).   
The issue surrounding the success of current and future counter-
terrorism operations is not necessarily a question of how much information has 
been obtained; but instead, what methods, policies, and strategies are readily 
accessible in order for law enforcement of every caliber to efficiently facilitate 
evidence procurement, in addition to successfully counter homegrown 
radicalisation.  Due to its intricacy, this extremist phenomenon is far too 
overwhelming for law enforcement to combat on their own without infringing 
on lawful Internet use, as well as the privacy and civil liberties of individual 
users.  Unfortunately, current U.S. legislature seems reluctant to follow the 
revolutionary trend of technological innovation and has thereby been exposed 
to certain vulnerabilities in the technology realm that hinder its application. 
Consequently, the White House has fallen short of their promise to “develop a 
separate, more comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent 
extremist online radicalization and leveraging technology to empower 
community resilience.” Instead, current U.S. ‘strategies’ are mostly limited to 
constructing an extensive knowledge base for understanding characteristics 
related to the radicalisation process and engaging the American Muslim 
community.   
In contrast to the White House strategy that seeks to prevent violent 
extremist online radicalisation by leveraging technology to empower 
community resilience, I suggest a U.S. strategy which advocates an increase in 
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communication and cooperation between public and private partnerships 
(PPP’s), in addition to encouraging private corporations – like Facebook, Apple 
and Twitter - to establish privately funded counter-terrorism units.  Sufficient 
PPP’s are critical in efforts to successfully combat online-radicalisation and 
terrorism.  Accordingly, they would increase the efficiency of mitigating 
potential threats through a bilateral approach.  Moreover, implementation of de-
radicalisation programs, similar to the ones found in Muslim majority countries, 
such as: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, should be investigated further.  Likewise, preexisting 
pilot programs, identical to the three current programs that stand in several U.S. 
states – Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Boston - should expand and continue to 
focus collectively on societal concerns, community engagement, and 
interventions with radicalised individuals (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 1).  
In hindsight, state action is an important form of strategic 
communication and therefore significant to counter violent extremism (CVE) 
initiatives on and offline.  Contradicting its altruistic purpose, however, are non-
state actors who are, more often than not, eager to use state action (and 
sometimes inaction) to incite and legitimise violence against the state and its 
citisens (Cheong, 2016, p. 283).  In comparison to this, counter-radicalisation 
programs are an immensely complex and controversial subject which, in one’s 
own opinion, requires gradual application (Vidino, 2010, p. 10).  However, as a 
testament to topics covered, other intriguing avenues of research I am open to 
explore in the future involve online deradicalisation and methods of a counter – 
ideological response (CIR), more specifically Ramakrishna’s developed CIR 
model.  Firstly, online deradicalisation acknowledges the increasing use of how 
online platforms influence and aid violent extremism.  The online 
deradicalisation to which I am referring, seeks to implement psychotherapeutic 
techniques by predominately employing cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) 
online (Shi, 2016).  The rationale behind such an idea, is that it provides an 
outlet to what would be considered as professional communication held 
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between a qualified counselor and a radicalised individual.  Moreover, the 
concept offers user convenience, opportunities to elaborate on manifested 
thoughts via physical disconnect, in addition to therapeutic reflection (Shi, 
2016).  As a result, the dialogue held between both parties could be facilitated 
over great distances; thus minimising the need for physical exposure as well as 
simultaneously assuring safety (Shi, 2016).  
A second avenue of interest would most likely be familiarising one’s 
self with what is referred to as a ‘counter- ideological response' (CIR).  CIR 
essentially consists of five conceptual spaces (sender, message, mechanism, 
recipient and context) to which violent extremism is sought to be countered by 
means of appropriate, ideological –relevant, policy interventions (Ramakrishna, 
2016).  In essence, a counter- ideological response customised for each of the 
five spaces seeks to negatively impact the overall reach and influence of violent 
extremism by intervening through the medium of legislation (Ramakrishna, 
2016).  CIR insists that ‘ideology’ as the centre of gravity within all violent 
Islamist terrorist networks.  Moreover, CIR recognises that neutralising violent 
extremism online requires something more than a model strictly applied to the 
online space as well as its many platforms.  Additionally, CIR further suggests 
that its five conceptual platforms within the counter- ideological response also 
be implemented into various offline contexts.  When employed in unison, CIR 
stands to engage a comprehensive strategy to prevent further proliferation of 
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